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I. INTRODUCTION
In South Korea, after extensive national Truth and Reconciliation
Commission fact-finding and recommendations on a range of atrocities,
survivor-participants confronted minimal government implementation
efforts.1 They saw in 2010 “institutionalize[d] attempts to frustrate the goals
and functionality of [the] truth commission.”2
*

Fred T. Korematsu Professor of Law and Social Justice, William S. Richardson School
of Law, University of Hawai’i.
**
J.D. 2015, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai’i.
***
J.D. 2015, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai’i.
The authors thank Eve Yeung for her valuable research contributions.
1
See infra Sections III.A, IV.B and V.C & D (describing the South Korea Truth and
Reconciliation Commission process and impacts).
2
See Tara Melish, Implementing Truth and Reconciliation: Comparative Lessons for
the Republic of Korea, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 42 (2012).
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In Peru, despite initial progress, those suffering from the government’s
prolonged fight with insurgents called loudly for follow through on truth
commission recommendations.3 They demanded in 2013 badly-needed,
long-delayed economic justice.4
In South Africa, the widely praised post-apartheid reconciliation initiative
faced charges of having “fallen tragically short.”5 The former chair of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission lamented in 2014 that by “choosing
not to follow through on the commission’s recommendations, [the]
government not only compromised the commission’s contribution to the
process, but the very process itself.”6
And in the United States, after apologizing to Native Hawaiians for the
illegal overthrow of the sovereign Hawaiian nation and committing to
reconciliation, shifting American political leadership and conservative
justices halted steps in 2015 toward indigenous self-governance.7 “For too
long,” implored a Native Hawaiian leader, “[we] have waited for the United
States . . . to make right the wrong . . . only to see the small steps taken for

3
See infra Section V.D (describing Peru Truth and Reconciliation Commission
recommendations and impacts).
4
See infra Section V.D (describing the need for economic justice in Peru).
5
See infra notes 6 and 238 and accompanying text.
6
Desmond Tutu, Tutu: ‘Unfinished Business’ of the TRC’s Healing, MAIL &
GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2014), http://mg.co.za/article/2014-04-24-unfinished-business-ofthe-trc-healing; see also infra Sections III.A and IV.B & C (describing the South Africa
Truth and Reconciliation Commission process and impacts).
7
See Chloe Fox, Supreme Court Blocks Native Hawaiians’ Attempt to Form Own
Government, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 2, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/supreme-court-hawaiielection_us_565f6849e4b079b2818d1767 (discussing how the Supreme Court of the
United States granted an injunction, requested by a group of Native Hawaiians and nonHawaiians, challenging an election that Native Hawaiians hoped to use to form their own
government and therefore “indefinitely stopped” Native Hawaiians from moving forward
“until at least the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals issues its ruling on the election”).
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our benefit persistently attacked . . . Reconciliation has been an option thus
far denied.”8
In recent years, governments and populaces embarked on major
reconciliation initiatives to heal the persisting wounds of historic injustices.
With an emphasis on personal and societal benefits of victim storytelling,
perpetrator apologies, compensatory or symbolic payments, institutional
reordering, and public education, reconciliation initiatives emerged on the
political agendas of both established and transitioning democracies.9
Acknowledging and repairing the damage of grievous transgressions
signaled government and populace commitments to human rights and
reparative justice.10 And it illuminated the high aspirations and moral tenor
of civil societies.11
Despite those aspirations and commitments and notwithstanding major
reconciliation undertakings in South Korea, Peru, South Africa, the United
States, and beyond, reconciliation initiatives stall.12 Genuine social healing
awaits. As eloquently recited by the National Survivors Network in its 2015
petition to the Kenyan National Assembly, the “lack of a framework for
implementing the recommendations of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation
Commission” has “huge repercussions on the lives of hundreds of victims

8

Statement by Trustee Haunani Apoliona, Chairperson, Board of Trustees, Office of
Hawaiian Affairs; Testimony offered to the Committee on Senate Indian Affairs,
February 25, 2003; see also infra note 39 and accompanying text (describing partial
United States and Native Hawaiian reconciliation efforts).
9
See, e.g., TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF CAN.,
http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/index.php?p=3 (last visited July 15, 2016); Hun
Joon Kim, Truth Commissions in South Korea: Lessons Learned, MIDDLE EAST INST.
(2013), http://www.mei.edu/content/truth-commissions-south-korea-lessons-learned
(describing South Korea’s transitional justice measures since the democratic transition in
1987); see also infra Sections II & IV.B.
10
See infra Section II.A (referencing various global reconciliation initiatives).
11
See infra Section II.A (describing an “Age of Reconciliation”).
12
See infra Section II.B (analyzing stalled global reconciliation initiatives).
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who bear the scars of past serious human rights abuses.”13 The systemic
failure to follow through on the commission’s reparative directives
“under[cuts] victims’ ability to obtain closure and restart their lives.”14
Why, then, despite substantial investments of time, energy, and money,
are there often failures to follow through on truth commission reparative
recommendations? And after considerable global truth commission
experience, why are participants left without a workable framework for
implementing crucial recommendations?
More practically, in light of the persisting wounds of injustice, what
needs to be done and by who to recalibrate and reinvigorate reconciliation
stalled? In concept and in practice. Now and in the future. At bottom, how
do we, as members of civil societies, bridge the chasm between aspiration
and realization?15
These questions lie at the heart of our inquiry into the implementation of
truth commissions’ reconciliation recommendations. That specific inquiry is
guided more broadly by social healing through justice—an analytical
approach for shaping, evaluating, and reconfiguring reconciliation
initiatives aimed at engendering healing for those still suffering deep
wounds of injustice and for society itself.16 This approach is grounded

13
Kenyan Victims Demand National Assembly Adopt TRJC Report and Implement
Recommendations, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL J. (Dec. 4, 2015),
http://www.ictj.org/news/kenyan-victims-demand-national-assembly-adopt-tjrc-reportand-implement-recommendations.
14
Id. (quoting Christopher Gitari, Head of the Kenya Office of the International Center
for Transitional Justice, who commented on the impact of legislative inaction of
reparations recommendations).
15
See infra Section III.B (describing the “enormous chasm”).
16
Briefly stated, the social healing through justice framework aims (1) to provide an
analytical structure grounded in common points among respected academic disciplines,
(2) which draws insights from the successes and failures of actual redress initiatives, (3)
and employs a common language that attempts to speak to the hearts and minds of
communities in conflict, (4) while serving as a strategic guide for shaping, and then
assessing, reparatory justice initiatives. See Eric K. Yamamoto and Sara Lee, Korean
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theoretically—it draws from commonalities among several disciplines
(particularly social psychology, political theory, economics, and human
rights law).17 It is also pragmatic—it acknowledges practical redress
experiences and the strategic significance of a convergence of interests and
is attentive to words, actions, and realpolitik influences.18 And this approach
to social healing engages individuals, communities, justice organizations,
businesses, and governments in a dynamic process of recognition,
responsibility, reconstruction, and reparation19—the “Four Rs”—with the
larger aim of fostering the kind of reparative justice that heals.20
“Comfort Women” Redress 2012 Through the Lens of U.S. Civil and Human Rights
Reparatory Justice Experiences, 11 KOREAN L.J. 123, 138-39 (2012).
17
See id.
18
See id.
19
Commonalities among diverse disciplines (social psychology, theology, economics,
law—including international human rights—political theory, and indigenous healing)
highlight four aspects of the kind of justice that fosters social healing: recognition,
responsibility, reconstruction, and reparation. See id. These four points of inquiry assist
groups and governments first in shaping a particular redress initiative and then in
assessing whether the effort is on the path toward genuine social healing. See id. For
elaboration upon the 4Rs (summarized below) in operation, see id. See also Eric K.
Yamamoto & Ashley Kaiao Obrey, Reframing Redress: A “Social Healing Through
Justice” Approach to United States-Native Hawaiian and Japan Ainu Reconciliation
Initiatives, 16 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5, 33 (2009) [hereinafter Yamamoto & Obrey, Reframing
Redress]. See generally ALFRED BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO AND CON (2006); Carlton
Waterhouse, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Moral Agency and the Role of Victims in
Reparations Programs, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 257, 267 (2009).
Recognition “addresses the psychological” by examining the historical, cultural, and
structural context for past and continuing suffering. See ERIC YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL
JUSTICE: CONFLICT & RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 175-85 (2000)
[hereinafter YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE]. By investigating the ways in which
individuals “continue to suffer pain, fear, shame and anger,” by decoding “cultural
stereotypes that seemingly legitimize” injustice, and by scrutinizing “the ways that
organizational structures” contribute to the injustice, participants can arrive at a
recognition of the harm that paves the way for future healing. Id.
Responsibility includes both “assessment of power over others” and “acceptance of
responsibility of repairing the damage . . . imposed on others through power abuses.” Id.
at 185. By focusing not only on the assessment of responsibility, but also on acceptance
of the responsibility to act, the mutual engagement of participants that leads to successful
healing is ensured. Id.
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According to David Tolbert, president of the International Center for
Transitional Justice, 40 national truth commissions, along with reparations
programs and prosecutions, have initiated paths toward social healing
through justice.21 They “have given victims a voice and recognized their
Reconstruction aims to build “new productive relationships.” Id. at 161-62. Effectively
building the kind of relationships needed for successful healing and a sense of justice
restored might include “apologies and forgiveness,” reframing the “history of
interaction,” and the “reallocation of political and economic power.” Id. Reallocation of
power, through change in a “state’s social, legal or political institutions and policies,” is
an important part of reconstruction as it can assure underlying abuses will not be
repeated. See Yamamoto & Obrey, Reframing Redress, supra, at 34.
Reparation draws from its root word “repair.” See YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL
JUSTICE, supra, at 35. While it may include restitution, monetary payments, and
“medical, legal, or educational and financial support for individuals and communities in
need,” reparation encompasses more than money. Id. Reparation as repair, and
reparations as specific reparative actions, also encompasses rehabilitation, “restoration of
property, rebuilding of culture, economic development” and public education. Id. Public
education particularly can serve to “commemorate, impart lessons learned, and . . .
generate a new justice narrative about a democracy’s commitment to civil and human
rights.” Id.
20
The framework, originally termed “interracial justice,” was initially developed in
YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 19. See also DAVID HANSEN, NATIVE
AMERICANS, THE MAINLINE CHURCH, AND THE QUEST FOR INTERRACIAL JUSTICE
(2016) (interpreting and employing the 4Rs reconciliation framework to assess
reconciliation efforts with Native Americans).
21
David Tolbert, A Wrong Turn for Human Rights, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST.
(Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.ictj.org/news/wrong-turn-human-rights; see generally THE
POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 58 (Will Kymlicka &
Bashir Bashir eds., 2008) (addressing the salutary and regressive potential of
reconciliation initiatives); Adrian Little, Disjunctured Narratives: Rethinking
Reconciliation and Conflict Transformation, 33(I) INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 82, 86 (2011)
(rethinking the idea of reconciliation as a key aspect of transitional justice); Yamamoto &
Obrey, Reframing Redress, supra note 19, at 21 (describing social benefits and problems
of incompleteness of reconciliation initiatives).
The International Center for Transitional Justice is an international non-profit
organization that “works to help societies in transition address legacies of massive human
rights violations and build civic trust in state institutions as protectors of human rights.”
About Us, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST., https://www.ictj.org/about (last visited July
15, 2016). The International Center assists institutions and civil society groups “in
considering measures to provide truth, accountability, and redress for past abuses.” Id. In
particular, the International Center provides technical expertise and knowledge in the
following ways: advising government institutions and policymakers at all levels with a

VOLUME 15 • ISSUE 1 • 2016

115

116 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

suffering, while signaling to culprits that their crimes will not be
forgotten.”22
Yet, as briefly recounted at the outset, reconciliation initiated does not
signal social healing achieved. Reconciliation is a long-term, multi-faceted
political, social, and economic process.23 It bears potential not only for
significant legal and social benefits, but also for incompleteness and even
regression.24 Recognizing injustice and accepting responsibility (words) do
not themselves assure reconstruction and reparation (actions). Many now
see even well-structured reconciliation initiatives as stalled works in
progress.25
Writing for the International Center for Transitional Justice, Eduardo
González aptly observes that a truth commission’s findings and
recommendations are a key piece, but only a piece, of the reconciliation
process. Implementation requires a convergence of factors, particularly
political will; it is illusory to assume that government and private actors will
automatically follow through.26 Executive and legislative implementing
focus on government responsibility for past human rights violations; working with
victims’ and women’s groups, human rights activists, and civil society with a justice
agenda; and researching, analyzing, and reporting on transitional justice developments
worldwide through publications, policy recommendations, working sessions, and
international convenings. Id.
22
Tolbert, supra note 21; see generally MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS (1998) (exploring various struggles globally to find meaningful responses
to historic injustices that fall between stark vengeance and unilateral forgiveness).
23
See infra Section IV.B (discussing the prevailing reconciliation template).
24
See Eric K. Yamamoto, Miyoko Pettit & Sara Lee, Unfinished Business: A Joint South
Korea and United States Jeju 4.3 Tragedy Task Force to Further Implement
Recommendations and Foster Comprehensive and Enduring Social Healing through
Justice, 15 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 38 (2014).
25
See HUN-JOON KIM, THE MASSACRES AT MT. HALLA: SIXTY YEARS OF TRUTH
SEEKING IN SOUTH KOREA, 11-13, 166-67 (2014) (discussing South Korea’s
reconciliation efforts).
26
Eduardo González et al., Risks and Opportunities in a Truth Commission Process, in
Challenging the Conventional: Can Truth Commissions Strengthen Peace Processes?,
INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 1, 15, 22 (2014), https://www.ictj.org/challenging-
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actions

often

proceed

slowly.

Political

organizing

consciousness and applies pressure for implementation.

raises
27

public

Experience

shows, however, that sporadic public scrutiny and political pressure are not
enough after a commission makes recommendations to compel long-term
follow-through.28
Reconciliation policymakers, scholars, and advocates now search for a
cogent next-step framework for assessing and refashioning troubled
reconciliation initiatives.29 That search is both conceptual and practical.
Implementation (like creation and operation) functions in an intensely legal
and political environment.30 Participation by a range of stakeholders—
bolstered by local, national, and international scrutiny—is essential to
effectiveness and accountability.31
With realpolitik influences in mind, to facilitate recalibration and
rejuvenation, we suggest remaking a key part of the prevailing
reconciliation template rather than scrapping reconciliation initiatives
conventional-truth-commissions-peace/docs/ICTJ-Report-KAF-TruthCommPeace2014.pdf.
27
See generally DONATELLA DELLA PORTA & MARIO DIANI, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: AN
INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2009) (focusing on political movements and their impact on
society and politics); MEGAN MING FRANCIS, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN AMERICAN STATE (2014) (examining the importance and consequences of the
civil rights movement on the process of state building in American political and
constitutional development); JOSEPH F. HEALEY & EILEEN O’BRIEN, RACE, ETHNICITY,
GENDER, AND CLASS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF GROUP CONFLICT AND CHANGE (2014)
(describing how the civil rights movement raised awareness about injustice against
minorities and led to political changes for other minority groups).
28
See infra Sections III, IV.C & V.A (describing unimplemented truth commission
recommendations). Reasons may vary for lesser-sustained post-commission collective
efforts for implementation—people have already been given a recognized voice through
public hearings, causes have been investigated, some recommendations have been acted
upon, and collective political energy is directed elsewhere. This subject warrants further
inquiry.
29
See generally id. at 2 (urging drafters and other stakeholders pay less attention to
general standards and more “to realities on the ground”); see also infra Section V.
30
See infra Section V.
31
See infra Section V.B.
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altogether without viable alternatives for social healing. This remaking
entails a new, formalized fourth step in the truth and reconciliation process.
This proposed fourth step—an Assessment, Implementation, and Oversight
Task Force—is an independent yet politically attuned stakeholdercomprised follow-up body to assess and update existing recommendations,
to facilitate the implementation of outstanding recommendations, and to
refashion and oversee future reconstructive and reparative actions to
further comprehensive and enduring social healing.32
The Assessment, Implementation, and Oversight Task Force would
undertake (1) integrated convenings of survivor groups, government
officials, businesses, policymakers, and justice advocates, with oversight
from journalists and civil society organizations; (2) an assessment of
original truth commission findings and recommendations, particularly an
evaluation of fairness and completeness;33 (3) a grounded critique of
government, business, and community implementation of truth commission
recommendations to date, particularly those aimed at institutional
restructuring, economic justice, and public education;34 and (4) the
recalibration and oversight of paths toward further reparative justice in light
of evolving social, political, and economic conditions.
To lay the foundation, this article’s Section II describes the global
reconciliation setting by canvassing salutary and troubled initiatives.
Section III addresses the implementation challenge in bridging the chasm
32

See Yamamoto et al., supra note 24, at 37-81 (acknowledging the need for a fourth
step mechanism to further the reconciliation process and describing a potential Joint Task
Force to further social healing efforts in South Korea).
33
See Eric K. Yamamoto and Susan K. Serrano, Healing Racial Wounds? The Final
Report of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T
ENOUGH 492, 496 (Roy Brooks ed., 1999) (providing a positive, though not necessarily
critical, evaluation of South Africa’s TRC report).
34
See Melish, supra note 2, at 29 (observing that comparative lessons from Cambodia,
Peru, and South Africa focus on these aspects of implementation, including “communitylevel reconciliation, economic reparation packages, and memorialization initiatives”).
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between reconciliation aspiration and realization. Section IV starts with a
glimpse of reconciliation theory. It then describes the three-step basic
structure of the prevailing reconciliation template: truth revelation, criminal
prosecutions or amnesty, and executive or legislative action on
reconstruction and reparation. The section concludes by painting a recurring
picture of unfulfilled promises and identifies what is missing.
Section V shapes these insights, along with principles of social healing
through justice,35 into a more fully delineated new fourth step for better
implementing truth commission social healing recommendations—an
approach

embodied

pragmatically

in

the

suggested

Assessment,

Implementation, and Oversight Task Force (“Task Force”). The section then
describes comparative case study snapshots of two beneficial—though still
limited—implementation efforts arising out of Peru’s (no government
participation) and South Korea’s (too much government control) follow-up
efforts. It concludes with observations about the potential and limitations of
an integrated government-community-civil society task force.
The aim of this article is not to fashion a cure-all for reconciliation ills.
Rather its aim is to advance a crucial next step, in concept and practical
structure, for channeling often fractious political and social interests further
down a mutually beneficial path toward social healing through justice.

II. THE SETTING: RECONCILIATION UPLIFTED, RECONCILIATION
CRITICIZED
A. An “Age of Reconciliation”
Reconciliation initiatives proliferate. In the United States, a congressional
truth commission investigated the mass incarceration of Japanese

35
See infra Section IV.A for a discussion of the social healing through justice
framework.
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Americans during World War II.36 The national government adopted the
commission’s recommendations and, in 1988, authorized a groundbreaking
congressional and presidential apology, provided symbolic individual
reparations, and funded public education projects.37 These words and
actions aimed to heal the wounds of 100,000 mostly American citizens
wrongly incarcerated because of their race and to repair the damage to
America’s ethos of equal justice under law.38 Soon after, the US Congress
and President formally apologized to Native Hawaiians for the 1893 illegal
overthrow of the sovereign Hawaiian nation and promised, and later
approved, initial actions toward reconciliation.39
36

See COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL
JUSTICE DENIED (1983) (official report of the Commission detailing the congressional
investigation of the World War II internment of mainly Japanese Americans),
https://www.archives.gov/research/japanese-americans/justice-denied/.
37
See generally ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, MARGARET CHON, CAROL IZUMI, JERRY KANG &
FRANK WU, RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT (2d ed. 2013).
38
See COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, supra note
36; YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 37.
39
See Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150 (1993). In November 1993, 100 years
after the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, President William Clinton signed the
Apology Resolution into law. See id. In addition, the Hawai’i Supreme Court and state
legislature partially addressed the state’s commitment to reconciliation with Native
Hawaiians over self-governance and claims to homelands taken more than a hundred
years ago in the illegal, US-aided overthrow of the Hawaiian nation. See Jesse
Greenspan, Hawaii’s Monarchy Overthrown with U.S. Support, 120 Years Ago, HISTORY
(Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.history.com/news/hawaiis-monarchy-overthrown-with-u-ssupport-120-years-ago. The Hawai’i Supreme Court reinforced the state’s legislative
commitment to reconciliation by commanding that the governor stop selling formerly
native-owned lands (now held in trust by the State of Hawai’i partially for the benefit of
Native Hawaiians) until indigenous Hawaiian reparations claims to these lands resolved
politically. Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cty. Dev. Corp., 177 P.3d 884, 902
(Haw. 2008) (ruling on the basis of state law while incorporating aspects of federal law).
But see Hawai‘i v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009) (vacating state
supreme court decision on federal law grounds and remanding to state court to determine
whether state law alone provided independent grounds for its ruling). In recent years,
both federal and state governments have taken steps—met with support as well as
vehement opposition—to act upon commitments to fully reconcile with Native Hawaiians
either through recognition of Hawaiian independence or through some other form of
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More recently, in the language of reconciliation, the US Senate
apologized to African Americans for its failure to stem the early twentiethcentury epidemic of southern state lynchings, and the US House of
Representatives apologized for the horrific harms of slavery and Jim Crow
segregation.40 The House also apologized to Native Americans and Native
Alaskans for taking lives and land and destroying native culture.41 These
federal apologies followed path-breaking apologies for slavery by the state
legislatures of Florida, Maryland, North Carolina, Alabama, New Jersey,
and Virginia.42 Virginia’s lawmakers also expressed regret for devastating
Native American life, land, and culture43—strong words of remorse and an
articulated desire for reconciliation.44
Private institutions in the United States also employed the language of
reconciliation. In 2015, University of Missouri’s president resigned after

government-to-government relationship. See Michael Grass, As Feds Hold Hearings,
Native Hawaiians Press Sovereignty Claims, GOV’T EXEC. (Aug. 12, 2014),
http://www.govexec.com/state-local/2014/08/hawaii-sovereignty-department-interiorhearings/91247/ (describing Native Hawaiian sovereignty movements and the recent
hearings held about possible federal recognition of Native Hawaiians).
40
H.R. Res. 194, 110th Cong. (2008); Congress Apologizes for Slavery, Jim Crow, NPR
(July 30, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93059465; see
also SHERRILYN IFILL, ON THE COURTHOUSE LAWN: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF
LYNCHING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2007) (describing Congress’ failure to take
any steps to halt the epidemic of African American lynching).
41
See Sean McCollum, An American Apology, Long Overdue, TEACHING TOLERANCE
(Jan. 6, 2010), http://www.tolerance.org/blog/american-apology-long-overdue.
42
See, e.g., Damien Cave & Christine Jordan Sexton, Florida Legislature Apologizes for
State’s History of Slavery, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/us/27florida.html (covering the spate of apologies
by states with a history of slavery); see also Robert Allen, Past Due: The African
American Quest for Reparations, 28 THE BLACK SCHOLAR 2-17 (1998) (focusing on
reparations as “a matter of social justice for African Americans”).
43
See S.J. Res. 332, 2007 Sess. (Va. 2007). See also HANSEN, supra note 20
(documenting mainline denomination American churches’ apologies to Native Americans
for participation in abusive boarding schools and for past support of the landdispossessing “doctrine of discovery”).
44
See Yamamoto & Obrey, Reframing Redress, supra note 19, at 21.
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failing to address student grievances about racism,45 and Georgetown
University’s president convened a Working Group on Slavery and
Reconciliation to respond to the university’s roots in the slave trade.46
Brown University undertook a year-long public educational dialogue about
its slavery history47 with an eye toward racial healing.48 And business giants
Wachovia, Aetna, and J.P. Morgan Chase apologized for their historical
roles in the slave industry.49

45

See Eliott C. McLaughlin, University of Missouri President and Chancellor Step
Down Amid Race Row, CNN (Nov. 9, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/09/us/Missouri-football-players-protest-presidentresigns/index.html (reporting on the resignation of the University of Missouri president
and chancellor amid a campus controversy over race).
46
Christina Cauterucci, Why Protesting Georgetown Students Want Their School to Pay
a Novel Form of Reparations, THE SLATEST (Nov. 13, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/11/13/georgetown_students_protest_a_resid
ence_hall_named_for_a_slave_selling_jesuit.html.
47
See Letter from Ruth J. Simmons, President, Brown University, to Steering Committee
on Slavery and Justice, Brown University (Apr. 30, 2003), http://
brown.edu/Research/Slavery_Justice/about/charge.html; Slavery, the Brown Family of
Providence and Brown University, BROWN U. NEWS SERV., http://
www.brown.edu/Administration/News_Bureau/Info/Slavery.html.
48
See generally Pam Belluck, Panel Suggests Brown U. Atone for Ties to Slavery, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 19, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/19/education/19brown.html?fta=y (noting that the
issue of reparations for slavery was controversial); BROPHY, supra note 19.
49
Wachovia apologized “to all Americans, and especially to African Americans and
people of African descent,” but refused reparations. In 2002, Aetna acknowledged its role
in insuring slave owners and apologized, but refused reparations because courts would
not award them. J.P. Morgan also apologized for using more than ten thousand slaves as
collateral for loans. See Darryl Fears, Seeking More than Apologies for Slavery, WASH.
POST (June 20, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/06/19/AR2005061900694_pf.html; see also J.P. Morgan
Discloses Past Links to Slavery, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2005, at E2. Only J.P. Morgan
committed to reparatory action. It set up a $5 million scholarship program for African
American undergraduates from Louisiana. Ken Magill, From J.P. Morgan Chase, an
Apology and $5 Million in Slavery Reparations, THE SUN (Feb. 1, 2005),
http://www.nysun.com/business/from-jp-morgan-chase-an-apology-and-5-million/8580.
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Globally, countries energetically embarked down formal reconciliation
paths to repair the damage of historic injustice.50 Among established
democracies, New Zealand’s Waitangi Tribunal, with an eye on
reconciliation, made favorable determinations on indigenous Maori land
claims.51 And after years of debate about reconciliation, Australia’s new
prime minister apologized to its stolen generations52—thousands of
aboriginal children forcibly taken by the government en masse from their
homes and homelands.53
In the teeth of class action lawsuits and mounting political agitation, the
Canadian government and churches embarked on a far more extensive
program of reconciliation with Canada’s stolen generations.54 From the late
50

See, e.g., TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF CANADA, supra note 9; Kim, supra
note 9 (describing South Korea’s transitional justice measures since the democratic
transition in 1987).
51
See generally Joe Williams, Truth, Reconciliation, and the Clash of Cultures in the
Waitangi Tribunal, AUSTL. & N.Z.L. & HIST. E-JOURNAL 234 (2005). Many of those
determinations, however, also awaited implementing Crown government action amid
shifting political alignments. See id. (describing political process for government
approval of Tribunal awards).
52
See The Australian Prime Minister’s website, http:// www.pm.gov.au/node/5952 (last
visited Jul. 16, 2016) (text of Prime Minister’s apology speech); Tim Johnston, Australia
Says “Sorry” to Aborigines for Mistreatment, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/02/13/world/asia/13aborigine.html. See also Chris Cunneen,
Reparations, Human Rights and the Challenge of Confronting a Recalcitrant
Government, in THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES 2000-2003: INTO THE 21ST CENTURY:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REPARATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 183 (2003); Pamela
O’Connor, Reparations for Australia’s Removed Aboriginal Children: Defining the
Wrong, in THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES 2000-2003: INTO THE 21ST CENTURY:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REPARATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (2003).
53
See AUSTL. GOV’T, Sorry Day and the Stolen Generations,
http://www.australia.gov.au/about-australia/australian-story/sorry-day-stolen-generations
(last updated May 20, 2015) (referencing the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission’s Bringing Them Home report about the forcible separation of indigenous
children from their families and communities during the European occupation of
Australia).
54
Twelve thousand individual claimants brought lawsuits, including two class actions,
against the Canadian government and religious organizations. See $2B Package Unveiled
for Residential School Survivors, CBC.CA (Nov. 23, 2005), http://
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1800s, in the name of educational assimilation, Canada’s government
forcibly removed aboriginal children from families and placed them in
native residential schools that banned their mother tongue and inflicted
rampant physical and sexual abuse.55 In 2015, the Canadian government
formalized its reconciliation commitment.56 Its initiative encompassed
apologies, monetary payments, and creation of a healing foundation.57 And,
after the official publication of the Truth and Reconciliation report, newly
elected Prime Minister Justin Trudeau promised to seek a formal apology
from the Catholic Church for its pivotal role in operating and benefitting
from the grossly abusive schools.58
Across the Atlantic Ocean, in the language of reconciliation, then-Prime
Minister Tony Blair apologized for the British Empire’s sponsorship of and
profiting from slavery in its many colonies.59 Later, Foreign Secretary
www.tribemagazine.com/board/showthread.php?t=105565; see also Russell A.
Miller, Collective Discursive Democracy as the Indigenous Right to Self Determination,
31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 341, 380 (2006/2007) (discussing conflicting perspectives on
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination in international law). The pressure from
the Baxter class action resulted in the Canadian government negotiating an Agreement in
Principle, allotting $1.9 billion to fund a four-part reparations program. See Baxter v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2006] 83 O.R.3d 481 (Can.).
55
See Jennifer J. Llewellyn, Dealing with the Legacy of Native Residential School Abuse
in Canada: Litigation, ADR, and Restorative Justice, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 253, 255, 257
(2002).
56
See Julian Walker, The Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, LIBR. OF PARLIAMENT (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0848-e.pdf.
57
See id.
58
Susana Mas, Justin Trudeau Says He’ll Engage Pope on Apology for Church’s Role in
Residential Schools, CBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2015),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/aboriginal-residential-schools-trudeau-meeting1.3367026. Although not a formal apology, in 2009, Pope Benedict XVI “expressed his
sorrow at the anguish caused by the deplorable conduct of some members of the church.”
Id.
59
See Jonathan Petre, Blair’s Deep Sorrow for Slavery ‘Is Not Enough,’ DAILY
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 28, 2006), http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/11/28/nslave28.xml; see also
Esther Stanford, Reflections on a Global Reparations Conference, NEW NATION, Aug.
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William Hague and British High Commissioner of Nairobi Christian Turner
similarly expressed the government’s “sincere regret” for human rights
abuses in colonial Kenya.60 These apologies to Kenya’s indigenous Kikuyu,
also known as Mau Mau, complemented a political settlement of a partially
successful Mau Mau reparations suit before the British High Court in
2013.61 In the settlement’s wake, Caribbean nations demanded reparative
actions through suits against Britain and other European colonizers (France,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden).62 In France, political leaders
deployed the language of reconciliation following eruptions over

14, 2006, at 8 (describing a Pan-African movement for slavery reparations from Britain
and other European countries).
60
See Ian Cobain & Jessica Hatcher, UK to Expect More Colonial-Era Compensation
Claims, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jun/06/uk-more-colonial-era-compensationclaims (detailing British high officials’ statements of regret and acknowledgment of
wrongs in colonial Kenya).
61
See Miyoko Pettit, Who Is Worthy of Redress?: Recognizing Sexual Violence Injustice
Against Women of Color as Uniquely Redress-Worthy—Illuminated by a Case Study on
Kenya’s Mau Mau Women and Their Unique Harms, 33 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. &
JUST. 268, 270-72, 288-91 (2015) (describing the monumental political settlement
between the British government and Mau Mau survivors for atrocities committed during
colonial rule in Kenya). Most recently, over 40,000 Mau Mau survivors filed another
reparations lawsuit before British courts for similar claims of torture and ill treatment
under British colonial rule in Kenya. See Ken Olende, 40,000 Kenyans Demand
Compensation for British Atrocities in Mau Mau War, SOCIALIST WORKER (Nov. 4,
2014),
http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/art/39364/40,000+Kenyans+demand+compensation+fo
r+British+atrocities+in+Mau+Mau+war; Cahal Milmo, Mau Mau Uprising: Kenyans Still
Waiting for Justice Join Class Action over Britain’s Role in the Emergency,
INDEPENDENT (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/maumau-uprising-kenyans-still-waiting-for-justice-join-class-action-over-britains-role-in-theemergency-9877808.html (detailing the testimonies of claimants, who will not be test
cases, involving torture, extreme violence, and sexual assault).
62
This spate of recent lawsuits demanding forward-looking reparations is pending. Some
will be adjudicated in domestic courts; others will come before the International Court of
Justice in The Hague, Netherlands. See Don D. Marshall, Capitalism, Slavery and
Reparations Battle, STABROEK NEWS (Sept. 1, 2014),
http://www.stabroeknews.com/2014/features/09/01/capitalism-slavery-reparations-battle/.
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discrimination against mainly African immigrants.63 And Spain’s National
Court opened the reconciliation door to victims of the Franco dictatorship.64
Spotlighting South Africa’s transition from apartheid, social healing
initiatives also encompassed democracies emerging from despotic rule.65
Those initiatives spanned South and Central America (Chile, Peru,
Colombia, Guatemala, and Argentina), Africa (Morocco, Rwanda, Sierra
Leone, Kenya), and Asia (Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Nepal, Cambodia, and
South Korea).66 Most nations established investigative truth commissions as
a breakthrough public step toward recognizing and redressing historic and

63
See Julie Chi-Hye Suk, Equal By Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of
Antidiscrimination Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 309 (2007) (describing race riots in
France, the country’s “strict adherence to race-blindness”); Jennifer Kolstee, Time for
Tough Love: How France’s Lenient Illegal Immigration Policies Have Caused Economic
Problems Abroad and Social Turmoil Within, 25 PA. ST. INT’L L. REV. 317, 329, 330-35
(2006) (discussing the history of France’s immigration policy and explaining how
France’s tension with its former African colonies has caused “French resentment” and
“racism and discrimination against African immigrants”).
64
See Jim Yardley, Facing His Torturer as Spain Confronts Its Past, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/world/europe/facing-his-torturer-as-spainconfronts-its-past.html?_r=0 (describing criminal prosecution of regime enforcer “Billy
the Kid”). Most recently, amid calls for a formal truth commission, a Spanish court
ordered the first exhumation of a civil war victim from a mass unmarked grave. James
Badcock, Spain Exhumes Civil War Victim as Calls Grow for Truth Commission, THE
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 19, 2016),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/Europe/spain/12106843/Spain-exhumescivil-war-victim-as-calls-grow-for-truth-commission.html.
65
This is also known as “transitional justice” and refers to the “set of judicial and nonjudicial measures that have been implemented by different countries in order to redress
the legacies of massive human rights abuses,” including criminal prosecutions, truth
commissions, reparations programs, and institutional reforms. What Is Transitional
Justice?, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST., http://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice
(last visited July 15, 2016). Transitional justice specifically focuses on “achieving justice
in times of transition from conflict and/or state repression” through accountability and
redress. Id. It “provides recognition of the rights of victims, promotes civic trust and
strengthens the democratic rule of law.” Id.
66
See Pettit, supra note 61, at 278-79 (describing a wide array of reconciliation
initiatives globally).
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continuing harms.67 For instance, Kenya’s Truth, Justice and Reconciliation
Commission heard testimonies from thousands of victims (or family
members) about murder, torture, sexual assault, and forced displacement,
mainly surrounding the country’s controversial 2007 presidential election.68
The commission documented atrocities, assessed responsibility, and, in
2013, recommended extensive reparations for survivors.69
According to the International Center for Transitional Justice, 40 truth
and reconciliation commissions have given victims a voice and recognized
their suffering.70 We are amid an “Age of Reconciliation.”71

67

International human rights observers see truth commissions as part of an “effective
transitional justice policy and as instruments that can contribute to the rule of law and the
rights of victims of gross human rights violations.” Eduardo González, Set to Fail?
Assessing Tendencies in Truth Commissions Created After Violent Conflict, in
Challenging the Conventional: Can Truth Commissions Strengthen Peace Processes?,
INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 1, 1 (June 2014), https://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJReport-KAF-TruthCommPeace-2014.pdf. According to reparations scholar Eduardo
González, “[t]ruth commissions have become common components of post-conflict
policy, with parties involved in peace processes routinely including commissions in the
agendas of their negotiations and final agreements.” Id.
68
See THE FINAL REPORT OF THE TRUTH JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
OF KENYA (2013), available at http://digitialcommons.law.seattleu.edu/tjrc. See also
Makau Mutua, Republic of Kenya Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 15, 15-24,
34-56 (2004) (detailing the Task Force’s recommendation to establish the Truth, Justice
and Reconciliation Commission and possible goals for the commission).
69
See THE FINAL REPORT OF THE TRUTH JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
OF KENYA, supra note 68 (presenting the commission’s work, findings, and
recommendations). See also Kenyan Victims Demand, supra note 13 (discussing victims’
calls for the implementation of recommendations set forth in the Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission’s report).
70
Tolbert, supra note 21.
71
See generally THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES,
supra note 21, at 58 (addressing the salutary and regressive potential of reconciliation
initiatives); Little, supra note 21, at 86 (rethinking the idea of reconciliation as a key
aspect of transitional justice); Yamamoto & Obrey, Reframing Redress, supra note 19, at
21 (describing social benefits and problems of incompleteness of reconciliation
initiatives); Roy L. Brooks, The Age of Apology, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH 3 (Roy
L. Brooks ed., 1999) (describing an “Age of Apology”).
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B. Reconciliation Stalled
Yet, reconciliation initiated does not signal social healing achieved.
Reconciliation is a long-term multi-faceted political, social, and economic
process. It bears potential not only for significant benefits but also for
incompleteness and regression.72 Some characterize as a “soft option” those
initiatives granting amnesty to perpetrators as part of the reconciliation
bargain.73 Others observe many even well-structured reconciliation
initiatives whither at the end stages.74 For them, the “Age of Reconciliation”
is experiencing a “mid-life crisis.”75 What is clear is that reconciliation in
concept has disparate meanings and that reconciliation in practice has a
mottled record.
Reconciliation can mean a highly organized formal process of truth
telling and reparation76 or an apparently insincere smokescreen77 to hide
72

See Yamamoto et al., supra note 24, at 38.
See Mahmood Mamdani, Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC), 32 DIACRITICS 33, 33
(2002) (characterizing South Africa’s TRC as the “fruit of a political compromise whose
terms both made possible the Commission and set the limits within which it would
work”); J. Duffy & D. Ross, Bargaining for Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: A
Game-Theoretic Analysis, 20 S. AFRICAN J. OF PHILOSOPHY 66, 66-89 (2001) (examining
how policies creating truth and reconciliation commissions that “trade civil and criminal
amnesty with applicants in exchange for information” is an “imperfect information game,
where the commission attempts to maximize information (truth) while the applicant seeks
amnesty for the lowest possible price”).
74
See KIM, supra note 25, at 11-13, 166-67 (discussing South Korea’s unfinished truth
and reconciliation process).
75
See Yamamoto & Obrey, Reframing Redress, supra note 19, at 24.
76
See generally Brooks, supra note 71, at 10-11 (describing South Africa’s structured,
publicly transparent truth and reconciliation commission process); Penelope E. Andrews,
Reparations for Apartheid’s Victims: The Path to Reconciliation?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
1155 (2004); LYN S. GRAYBIL, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA:
MIRACLE OR MODEL (2002); DESMOND TUTU, WITHOUT FORGIVENESS THERE IS NO
FUTURE 35 (1999).
77
Nepal’s controversial effort to legislatively establish a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission to address the decade-long violence between the former royal government
and communist insurgents has been sharply criticized for, among other things, its failure
to embrace international human rights standards. See Amnesty International, Nepal:
73
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behind-the-scenes political maneuvering.78 Indeed, aboriginal groups, angry
about the government’s refusal to consider reparations, sharply criticized
Australia’s apology to its stolen generations,79 and Canadian indigenous
groups characterized as insincere Canada’s comprehensive reconciliation
initiative because of delayed implementation.80
Similarly, reparations proponents rebuked Britain’s words of apology for
slavery because Britain failed to embrace reparative acts toward
reconciliation.81 The Crown government’s long delay, likely for political
reasons, in finally acknowledging awards undercut the New Zealand
Waitangi Tribunal’s aboriginal land claims process.82 Native Hawaiians too

Reconciliation Does Not Mean Impunity—A Memorandum on the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission Bill (2007),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA31/006/2007/en/domASA310062007en.pdf.
78
Thirty years after the Pol Pot “Killing Fields,” Cambodia’s reconciliation project,
emerging out of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, appears to be mired in confusion and
political maneuvering. See Vannath Chea, Reconciliation in Cambodia: Politics, Culture
and Religion, in RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT 49-50 (David Bloomfield
et al. eds., 2003),
http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation_chap03cscambodia.pdf.
79
See Johnston, supra note 52; THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER’S WEBSITE, supra
note 52 (text of Prime Minister’s apology speech). See generally Cunneen, supra note
52, at 183; O’Connor, supra note 52, at 219.
80
See TRUTH HEALING RECONCILIATION (2008), available at http://www.trccvr.ca/pdfs/20080818eng.pdf. Some who suffered find the overall efforts less than
sincere, orchestrated by government for its own benefit, and lacking the kind of mutual
engagement necessary for genuine healing. Id. Following Canada, the Tasmanian
government committed to reconciliation, apologizing, and authorizing individual
reparations payments to its stolen generation of aboriginal children. Barbara McMahon,
Tasmania to Pay ‘Stolen Generation’ of Aborigines £2.2m in Reparations, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2008),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jan/23/australia.international. Yet, the social and
economic impacts of its promises are uncertain.
81
See Petre, supra note 59. See also Stanford, supra note 59, at 8 (describing a PanAfrican movement for slavery reparations from Britain and other European countries).
82
See generally Williams, supra note 51, at 234.
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criticized the United States for failing to follow through on its reconciliation
promises.83
Developing Latin American countries also experienced halting steps
toward reconciliation. For instance, despite Peru’s initial efforts,84 victims
of the government’s fight with insurgents called for disciplined followthrough on truth commission recommendations, emphasizing still badly
needed economic programs.85 For many, the delayed minimal economic
payments and the lack of real economic capacity-building signaled a
potential failure of the overall initiative.86
In Asia well-intentioned reconciliation initiatives inspired by the South
Korea democracy movement foundered at the implementation stages.87 The
absence of meaningful apologies and the lack of economic justice erected at
least partial roadblocks to social healing.88
83

See Grass, supra note 39 (describing the tension between US government actions and
Native Hawaiian sovereignty movements).
84
See Lisa J. Laplante, Truth with Consequences: Justice and Reparations in Post-Truth
Commission Peru, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 228, 241 (2007) (explaining that victims and
survivors are highly disappointed by the government’s failure to implement
recommendations).
85
See Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS
451, 470-71 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006); see also Lisa J. Laplante, Negotiating
Reparations Rights: The Participatory and Symbolic Quotients, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 217 (2012).
86
See Laplante, supra note 85, at 231 (pointing out that delays in implementing
reparatory measures left victims in Peru disillusioned with the work of the truth
commission). See also Mattia Cabitza, Slow Justice for Peru’s ‘Disappeared’ 20 Years
On, BBC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america15718695 (noting that some victims have been waiting for over thirty years to find out
what happened to their disappeared loved ones).
87
See generally Jae-Jung Suh, Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea, 42-4 CRITICAL
ASIAN STUD. 503-24 (2010) (describing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the
Republic of South Korea (TRCK) and noting its success in “bringing back the voices of
the silenced” but also pointing out the TRCK’s challenges and limitations).
88
See Hun Joon Kim, Trial and Error in Transitional Justice: Learning from South
Korea’s Truth Commissions, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 125, 158 (2012); Kim Dongchoon & Mark Seldon, South Korea’s Embattled Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
ASIA-PAC. J. (2010), http://www.japanfocus.org/-Kim-Dong_choon/3313/article.html
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Japan faced international opprobrium after backsliding on its earlier
acknowledgments of imperialist and World War II atrocities89 cast in the
language of desired reconciliation.90 In 2015, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s
special historical review panel praised the country’s postwar economic
growth and commitment to pacification but also cited “lack of

(printing an interview with Kim Dong-choon, the former Standing Commissioner of the
TRCK, in which he describes the achievements and challenges of the TRCK).
89
At the 2005 Asia-African Summit in Jakarta, which addressed multilateral efforts in
solving conflicts, then-Prime Minister Koizumi, in the general language of reconciliation,
acknowledged Japan’s imperial transgressions:
Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage
and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian
nations. Japan squarely faces these facts of history in a spirit of humility and
with a feeling of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in mind,
Japan has resolutely maintained, consistently since the end of World War II,
never turning into a military power but an economic power, its principle of
resolving all matters by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of force.
Japan once again states its resolve to contribute to the peace and prosperity of
the world in the future as well, prizing the relationship of trust it enjoys with
nations of the world.
Excerpts from Japan PM’s Apology, BBC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2005), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4471961.stm. See generally Jamie Sheu, Clash of Asia’s
Titans: China and Japan’s Struggle for “Reconciliation,” May 1, 2006 (unpublished
seminar paper, University of Hawai’i) (on file with author) (analyzing former Prime
Minister Koizumi’s rhetoric of reconciliation in addressing charges of human rights
violations by China).
90
See Japan’s Apologies for World War II, N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/08/13/world/asia/japan-ww2-shinzoabe.html?_r=0 (noting that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe failed to offer an apology in a
2015 speech, visited a shrine for Japan’s war criminals in 2014, and did not express
remorse as Japan’s leaders traditionally did in a 2013 speech). In 2007, the US House of
Representatives called upon Japan’s leaders to apologize to World War II Korean
military sex slaves and to offer them meaningful reparations. H.R. Res. 121, 110th Cong.
(2007) (calling on government to reverse policy against reparations for women forced
into sexual slavery for Japanese soldiers). Japan’s indigenous Ainu also demanded
redress for the longstanding but less well-known colonization of Ainu lands and
suppression of Ainu culture. See Yamamoto & Obrey, Reframing Redress, supra note 19,
at 21.
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reconciliation with China and South Korea” as a fount of escalating
criticism by those countries.91
Sometimes political instability disrupts implementation of even carefully
organized initiatives. In 2005, the new East Timor government established a
truth and reconciliation process to address the violence of 20 years of
Indonesian military rule.92 One of its pathbreaking tenets was gender
redress to heal East Timor women’s wounds of sexual violence.93 The truth
commission embarked on a remarkable program of psychological healing94
and economic support as a foundation for rebuilding the nation.95 But
political instability slowed, if not scuttled, the healing process.96
As this snapshot of troubled reconciliation initiatives reveals, the
reconciliation concept’s elasticity and shifting political underpinnings
provide little firm guidance to policymakers and justice advocates.97 They
91

Report on Japan’s History Meant to Ease Skepticism, HONOLULU STAR-ADVERTISER,
Aug. 8, 2015, at A4.
92
See generally Galuh Wandita, Karen Campbell-Nelson & Manuela Leong Pereira,
East Timor Declares Emergency: Reaching Out to Female Victims, in WHAT HAPPENED
TO THE WOMEN?: GENDER AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 290
(Ruth Rubio-Marín ed., 2006).
93
One of the Commission’s recommendations was that “at least 50% of resources in this
program shall be earmarked for female beneficiaries.” Id. at 308.
94
The Commission proposed the following:
[A] reparations program with five guiding principles–feasibility, accessibility,
empowerment, gender, and prioriti-zation [sic] based on need–with the aim to
repair, as far as possible, the damage to their [victims’] lives caused by the
violations, through the delivery of social services to vulnerable victims and
symbolic and collective measures to acknowledge and honor victims of past
violations. Id.
95

See id. at 290.
See Tim Johnston, East Timor Declares Emergency After Attack on Leaders, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 12, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/world/asia/12timor.html?scp=1&sq=
east%20timor%20emergency&st=cse.
97
See, e.g., Kim & Seldon, supra note 88 (noting that the TRCK’s current leadership is
unwilling to hold the United States accountable for its “indiscriminate bombing”
practices and other atrocities during the Korean War).
96
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render stated commitments to reconciliation susceptible to political mischief
as insincere cover for continuing hostilities or power grabs.98 And
reconciliation politics, by demanding agreement and consensus, at times
marginalizes or even silences discordant voices.99 Equally important, even
solidly conceived and operated truth commissions stumble at the stages of
implementation and follow through.100 Critics of varying aspects of
transitional justice abound, at times offering sharp and insightful
critiques,101 although often without advancing realpolitik alternatives for
social healing.102

98

See, e.g., id. (pointing out that the TRCK does not currently have the support of
certain key government institutions, including the police, the military, and the National
Intelligence Service).
99
See Lawrie Balfour, Act and Fact: Slavery Reparations as a Democratic Politics of
Reconciliation, in THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 96
(Will Kymlicka & Bashir Bashir eds., 2008) (endorsing disagreements, discord, and
differences in the reconciliation process “that cannot simply be managed, forgotten, . . .
[and] that resist[] the kinds of seamless narratives of national belonging that have been so
effective at silencing [minority] claims”); Adrian Little, The Complex Agon, in LAW AND
AGONISTIC POLITICS 193, 198 (Andrew Schaap ed., 2009).
100
See Alexander Keller Hirsch, Theorizing Post-Conflict Reconciliation, in THEORIZING
POST CONFLICT RECONCILIATION: AGONISM, RESTITUTION AND REPAIR i (Alexander
Keller Hirsch ed., 2012) (critiquing assumptions informing many reconciliation projects
and underscoring the importance and difficulty of “restitution and repair”); Bashir Bashir,
Accommodating Historically Oppressed Social Groups: Deliberative Democracy and the
Politics of Reconciliation, in THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN MULTICULTURAL
SOCIETIES 58 (Will Kymlicka & Bashir Bashir eds., 2008) (“[S]ymbolic compensation
without accompanying efforts to repair damaged conditions is [also] likely to be labeled
‘insincere.’”).
101
See generally THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES,
supra note 21, at 58; Hirsch, supra note 100, at i.
102
See Paul Muldoon, The Very Basis of Civility: On Agonism, Conquest, and
Reconciliation, in THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES,
114 (Will Kymlicka & Bashir Bashir eds., 2008); Erik Doxtader, Reconciliation – A
Rhetorical Conception, 89 Q.J. SPEECH 267 (2003); Mark Howard Ross, Ritual and the
Politics of Reconciliation, in FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RECONCILIATION 210
(Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov ed., 2004).
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Reconciliation policymakers, scholars, and advocates thus search for a
cogent framework for guiding, assessing, and refashioning troubled
reconciliation initiatives.

III. THE CHALLENGE: BRIDGING THE RECONCILIATION CHASM
Despite important steps forward, a society’s failure to implement
reconciliation recommendations, often for needed reconstruction and
reparation, means that the pain, blame, guilt, and economic dislocation
persist.103 Reconciliation stalled generates real, on-the-ground consequences
for people, communities, and societies. A momentous challenge, then, for
both established and developing democracies is this: how to follow through
on truth commission recommendations and recalibrate and rejuvenate
halting reconciliation initiatives.
A. Unfinished Business—Illustrations
An illuminating example of the reconciliation’s unfinished business is
South Africa’s TRC. Despite initial salutary efforts, South Africa’s
government stopped individual reparations payments and community
economic capacity-building.104 Additionally, South Africa’s businesses
reacted with notable indifference to the TRC recommendations that
businesses profiting from the racial caste system contribute to repairing the
damage.105 No South African companies operating during apartheid

103

See supra Section II.A & B.
See Phillip De Wet, Reparations Still on the Back Foot, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Nov. 16,
2012), http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-16-00-reparations-still-on-the-back-foot
(explaining why the President’s Fund—which was “created with the sole purpose of
making reparations for apartheid as part of the broader reconciliation drive”—has not
fulfilled its purpose); see also Eric K. Yamamoto & Brian Mackintosh, Redress and the
Salience of Economic Justice, FORUM ON PUBLIC POL’Y 11 (2010),
http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/vol2010.no4/archive.vol2010.no4/yamamoto.pdf.
105
Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 12; see Xolani Mbanjwa, R525m Paid
Out Since TRC Started, PRETORIA NEWS (July 16, 2008),
104
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contributed to the reparations fund.106 For Archbishop Tutu, this deliberate
corporate absence tears at the heart of the reconciliation initiative—business
payments “as a vehicle for those who had benefited from the past to
contribute to the future was stillborn.”107
More broadly, South Africa’s government and apartheid businesses fell
far short of implementing the TRC’s economic recommendations “to
advance economic transformation and enhance the economic participation
of black people in the South African economy.”108 Observers characterized
economic capacity-building programs as “poorly implemented” and
“wrought with corruption, fraud and misrepresentation.”109 For Archbishop
Tutu, genuine reconstruction and reparation for those harmed by apartheid
remain unfinished business.110
Similarly, in South Korea, some now view its TRCK recommended
reconstructive and reparative work for historic atrocities as starkly
incomplete. The South Korea government initially implemented several
TRCK recommendations from a partial list.111 But, as a media watchdog
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn20080716062642926C
223345.
106
See Mbanjwa, supra note 105.
107
Tutu, supra note 6.
108
See Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment, DEP’T OF TRADE & IND., REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA, https://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee.jsp (last
visited Aug. 10, 2016).
109
Harry C. Alford, South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment Program Has Failed,
NAT’L BLACK CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.nationalbcc.org/news/beyond-therhetoric/1228-south-africas-black-economic-empowerment-program-has-failed (last
visited May 19, 2015).
110
Tutu, supra note 6.
111
See generally Suh, supra note 87; Kim, supra note 9, at 158. South Korea leaders had
launched myriad reconciliation initiatives following the country’s transition to
democracy. See Tae-Ung Baik, Fairness in Transitional Justice Initiatives: The Case of
South Korea, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 169, 170 (2012). Since 1996, over 18 formal
truth and reconciliation commissions sought to repair the damage of historic injustice. Id.
Most commissions focused on singular events, including the 1980 Gwangju massacre, the
1951 Guchang massacre, and the pre-Korean War Jeju April 3rd Grand Massacre. See
Kim Dong-Choon, Korea’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: An Overview and
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observed,

this entailed

minimal effort because

the

implemented

recommendations reflected the “least expensive or least controversial
measures.”112 And changes in political leadership at times frustrated the
goals and functionality of the truth commission.113 Whatever the specific
reasons, the TRCK’s three key recommendations—individual payments, a
permanent research and oversight foundation, and acknowledgement of and
proper burial for mass murder victims—still await implementation.114
Assessment, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 98-99 (2012) (reviewing “a number of
special laws between 1995 and 2000 to settle certain unresolved historical cases”). By
contrast, the 2005 TRCK provided a comprehensive approach to investigate human rights
violations during the twentieth century, including atrocities during Japan’s colonial rule,
the Korean War, military authoritarian regimes, and the 1980s democracy movements.
See id. at 97 (describing TRCK investigation of “massacres, incidents of death, injury or
disappearance, politically fabricated trials, and the killing of unarmed civilians and
political prisoner before and during the Korean War”). The TRCK investigated individual
cases of human rights violations, at the request of victims and their families, and
recommended reparative actions to the appropriate government branches and agencies.
See id. Despite initial promising investigative findings and reparative recommendations,
many victims, survivors and families now express frustration at the truncated array of
TRCK recommendations and inadequate implementation of even express reparations
recommendations. See Kim, supra note 88, at 158.
112
Yun Hyeong Kil & O Seong Kwon, Government Bodies Stall in Implementation of
Truth and Reconciliation Recommendations, HANKYOREH (S. KOREA) (Apr. 15, 2009);
see Kim, supra note 88, at 158 (citing the newspaper’s opinion on the implementation of
TRCK recommendations). Out of 179 apologies recommended, the government has
issued only 52 as of 2010. Kim, supra note 88, at 158. And most of those apologies were
seen as inadequate. Id. According to Professor Hun Joon Kim, they were mere
expressions of “regret” or “condolences” by local police chiefs and low-profile military
commanders, rather than presidential or formal acceptances of responsibility for the
historic injustices. See id. at 157 (noting that the one exception was President Roh Moo
Hyun’s apology to the victims of civilian massacres during the Korean War, including the
Jeju 4.3 Tragedy). Regarding retrials, as of 2010, out of 42 cases recommended for a
retrial, only 18 victims were able to show they had been falsely convicted. Id.
113
Melish, supra note 2, at 42.
114
Kim, supra note 88, at 158-59 (noting that the “conservative wing of Korean society
vehemently attacked the commission” for its plan to create a permanent research
foundation). “Major conservative newspapers criticized [the TRCK] for ‘trying to extend
[its] work under [a] new title’ and impugned commissioners and staff as ‘people who are
trying to benefit from the research foundation with taxpayer money worth 800 billion
won.’” Id. at 159.
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Colombia’s extensive reconciliation initiative, too, remains partially
stuck in the implementation phase. Following truth commission
recommendations, in 2005, Colombia’s legislature enacted the Justice and
Peace Law to facilitate demobilization of paramilitary groups and to redress
50 years of massacres, forced disappearances, executions, torture, sexual
violence, kidnappings, and community displacements.115 The legislature
passed a follow-up 2011 Victims’ Law and other measures to facilitate
reparations for victims and to prevent repetition of human rights
violations.116 But its comprehensive 10-year reconciliation plan faced
mounting criticism.117 The inadequately financed and implemented
reparations program and the release of former paramilitary leaders after
reduced

prison

sentences,

reconciliation backsliding.

118

exacerbated

victims’

impressions

of

Many worried about the government’s

capacity to ensure safety in pockets of continuing armed resistance.119
115

See Maria Camila Moreno, Uncovering Colombia’s System of Macro-criminality,
INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.ictj.org/news/uncoveringcolombia-systems-macro-criminality; see also L. 975 D.O. (covering the legislation
passed to address victims’ reparations and demobilization). Of the paramilitary groups in
Colombia, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) is the largest and oldest. See FARC, INSIGHTCRIME.ORG,
http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile (last visited
Nov. 10, 2014). The group is estimated to have 8,000 guerillas in its ranks. Id. In 2014,
FARC commenced peace talks with the Colombia government. Id.
116
See Nicole Summers, Colombia’s Victims’ Law: Transitional Justice in a Time of
Violent Conflict? 25 HARV. HUM. RTS J. 221, 225; L. 1448 D.O. arts. 1, 8.
117
See Summers, supra note 116, at 234 (explaining how an important aspect of the
Victims Law, the “decentralization” of the institutions responsible for victims support, “is
likely to become an extensive barrier to victims”).
118
Moreno, supra note 115. Moreno describes the basic premise of the Justice and Peace
Law as a balance between demobilization of armed groups and their offer to guarantee
victims’ rights. See id. The current critique of Colombia’s reconciliation effort is the lack
of balance. See id. Armed conflict continues, and many of the combatants who agreed to
take part in the reconciliation process are reaping the benefits of a reduced prison
sentence but have failed to contribute to the Victims’ Reparation Fund. Id.; see also
Nicolas Bedoya, Criminal Politicians Fail to Repair Colombia’s Victims of Paramilitary
Violence, COLOMBIA REPORTS (Oct. 1, 2014), http://colombiareports.co/parapoliticianshanding-money-colombias-victims-reparation-fund/ (concluding that victimizers
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Implementation

of

Kenya’s

truth

commission’s

reparations

recommendations stalled in the National Assembly. Because the “National
Assembly’s inaction has had huge repercussions on the lives of hundreds of
victims who bear the scar of past serious human rights abuse,” the National
Victims Survivors Network petitioned the National Assembly in 2015 for
implementing action.120 The petition highlighted the “lack of a framework
for implementing the recommendations of the Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission” and recited how the failure of follow-up
“undermined victim’s ability to obtain closure and restart their lives.”121
B. The Chasm
Victims and families anxiously await promised reparative action. Their
deep disappointment with unfulfilled promises, particularly for economic
justice, threatens entire initiatives. Initial optimism over commission
investigations and victim story-telling morphs into bitterness about the
process itself.122

currently owe $650 million to the Victims’ Reparation Fund, but so far, only $1.5 million
has been paid); Victoria McKenzie, FARC Victims Form Federation to Defend Interests
During Peace Talks, COLOMBIA REPORTS, http://colombiareports.co/farc-victims-formnational-federation/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2016) (describing the recent formation of a
national federation of Colombian victims developed to promote 33 fundamental demands
and concerns related to the ongoing peace talks with FARC); Hope for Colombia’s Peace
Process, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1HptV98 (describing recent
negotiations between the Colombian government and FARC and noting that “[a]fter five
decades of war, the prospect of a negotiated deal, not surprisingly, has many critics
particularly among those whose family members have been killed or maimed in the
conflict . . . Some worry that guerrilla leaders who have committed atrocities could
escape punishment”).
119
See Summers, supra note 116, at 233 (detailing the difficulties imposed by the
continuing armed conflict and the issues related to the law’s guarantee of “security of the
returned victims and the prevention of re-victimization”).
120
Kenyan Victims Demand, supra note 13.
121
Id.
122
See supra Part II.B.
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Taken together, this disillusionment signals a deep chasm between
extensive truth commission mandates to develop detailed recommendations,
including individual assistance and major societal reforms, and the
dismissal or only limited implementation of these recommendations by
governments and businesses.123 The reasons for this chasm vary from
economic vagaries to leadership turnover to evolving geopolitical
relationships.124 Whatever the reasons, for some and perhaps many
reconciliation initiatives the enormity of the chasm threatens prospects for
genuine social healing.
This clouded picture of the reparative justice process is coming sharply
into view. According to Tolbert, president of the International Center for
Transitional Justice, even with the global growth of truth and reconciliation
initiatives, “the international community appears to be backsliding on its
human-rights commitments. The world’s powers lack any sense of urgency
in addressing abuses, preferring the pursuit of narrower, short-term interests
to investing in long-term peace and justice.”125 Tolbert acknowledges that
some countries are pursuing genuine redress as a cornerstone of
democracy.126 But the recalcitrance of others, “especially the emerging
powers, threatens to end the world’s all-too-brief era of accountability.”127
Yet, countries and communities persist down the reconciliation path—
possibly because of still-envisioned societal benefits, or because of the
absence of alternative comprehensive approaches to badly needed social
healing. What, then, is needed to bridge the chasm separating aspiration and

123
Neil Kritz, Policy Implications of Empirical Research on Transitional Justice, in
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CHALLENGES FOR EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH 13, 17 (Hug Van der Merwe et al. eds., 2009).
124
See infra Section V (discussing limiting forces). See generally Kim & Seldon, supra
note 88; Kim, supra note 88, at 158-59.
125
Tolbert, supra note 21.
126
Id.
127
Id.
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realization? What is needed to recalibrate and rejuvenate reconciliation in
concept and in practice?
South Africa’s approach to reconciliation through its truth commission
generated the template for later reconciliation initiatives.128 It coalesced
moral imperatives.129 It structured initiatives.130 And it deployed language
and imagery that highlighted possible common ground for initial political
action.131
Although giving public voice to numerous victims of apartheid violence
and initially garnering widespread praise, the South Africa reconciliation
initiative failed to generate a pervasive sense of real social healing over
time132—the chasm unbridged.133 The South Africa reconciliation process
thus embodied reparative action that was both bright—uplifting and
illuminating—and dark—quarrelous and possibly illusory.134
Policymakers and the public tend to focus on the salutary, to believe that
once a truth commission’s work is finished, the country will be reconciled
and the victims will naturally bestow forgiveness.135 But truth commissions
in operation are only a “part of a larger transitional justice process rather
than integral, one-time solutions in themselves.”136 Closely related, criminal
128

See Kritz, supra note 123, at 13-14.
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text.
133
Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 9 (exploring reconciliation initiatives,
and specifically the unfulfilled economic justice programs, of Peru and South Africa).
134
See South Africa: Impunity, Political Interference Emerge Below Veneer of a
Celebrated Reconciliation Process, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. (Feb. 19, 2016),
http://www.ictj.org/multimedia/audio/south-africa-impunity-nokuthula-simelane-justice
(describing one South African family’s 33 year wrenching “pursuit of truth and
accountability” for the abduction, torture, and disappearance of an anti-apartheid
activist).
135
González et al., supra note 26.
136
Id. For Professor Hun Joon Kim, “[t]he work of any truth commission does not end
with the mere completion of its mandate. Rather, that end is simply another beginning, as
we have seen in many international and domestic examples.” Kim, supra note 88, at 167.
129
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prosecutions or amnesty along with piecemeal legislative or executive
actions, though important, do not and cannot fully repair the damage of
injustice.137 Those kinds of actions, like truth commissions inquiries, serve
at best as a starting point for a much broader societal effort toward social
healing.138
Reparative justice scholars and advocates thus are beginning to extend
the theoretical framework for reconciliation to better account for practical
on-the-ground post-commission realities.139 Section V shapes this work into
a more fully delineated, new fourth step follow-up in the reconciliation
process—an Assessment, Implementation, and Oversight Task Force. As
the foundation for that fourth step, Section IV describes and critiques the
prevailing reconciliation template’s three steps.

IV. THE PREVAILING TEMPLATE
Post-World War II Holocaust reparations by Germany and private
businesses profiting from Jewish slave labor laid the early foundation for
reconciliation initiatives.140 In 1988, US redress for the internment of
Japanese Americans offered a multi-faceted process for healing wounds of
mass civil liberties violations and repairing damage to those incarcerated
and American society itself—a congressional truth finding investigation, a
presidential apology, individual reparations payments, and a public

137

See, e.g., Timeline: Transitional Justice Mechanisms in Colombia Since 2005, INT’L
CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. (2013), http://ictj.org/colombia-timeline/index_eng.html
(describing Colombia’s sometimes piecemeal reconciliation process).
138
See generally Kim, supra note 111, at 97; Melish, supra note 2, at 1.
139
See infra Section V; see generally González et al., supra note 26, at 2 (urging drafters
and other stakeholders to pay more attention “to realities on the ground”).
140
See generally Ariel Colonomos, German Reparations to the Jews after World War II:
A Turning Point in the History of Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS,
(Pablo de Grieff ed., 2006) (explaining that the German-Israeli reparations program after
World War II was “the largest, most comprehensive reparations program ever
implemented”).
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education fund.141 These and other reconciliation experiences, particularly
South Africa’s, shape a prevailing reconciliation template. This section
briefly articulates the template’s theoretical foundation, describes and
critiques its basic structure, and charts benefits and troubling limitations.
A. Reconciliation Theory
A selective description of reconciliation theory sheds light on the
philosophical grounding for the prevailing template’s integrated structural
components.142 The description surfaces discordant theoretical debates that
at times mirror volatile reconciliation experiences on the ground.
In theory, social healing embraces democratic notions of participation in
the social, economic, and political life of a polity.143 A breach in the polity
by wrongly excluding some from the community is repaired by fostering
reintegration and full participation.144 In practice, repairing the breach—
or reconciling—means salving psychological and economic wounds by
lifting barriers to liberty and equality in education, housing, medical care,
employment, cultural preservation, and political governance.145
The South African concept of ubuntu reflects those social healing
precepts.146 Ubuntu is the notion of interconnectedness—“people are people
through other people”—and emphasizes healing through reconfiguring the
141

See YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 311-75 (describing the
multi-step process of redress and reparations).
142
The descriptions here are truncated. They do not cover the field and are not attentive
to nuance or variation. Nevertheless, they provide a basic understanding of the theoretical
underpinnings of many on-the-ground reconciliation efforts.
143
See YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 9-13 (describing the
complex areas of social healing and reconciliation, especially as they relate to interracial
justice).
144
See id.
145
See generally Daniel Bar-Tal & Gemma H. Bennink, The Nature of Reconciliation as
an Outcome and as a Process, in FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RECONCILIATION 21
(Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov ed., 2004).
146
See Lynne Duke, Witness to a Celebration, WASH. POST, July 10, 1994, at W8
(discussing the concept of ubuntu).
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damaged polity.147 People suffering are not healed solely as individuals but
through incorporation into a collective body.148 Ubuntu “is far more restorative
[than retributive]—not so much to punish as to redress or restore a balance . . .
[it is] restorative of the dignity of the people” as part of a common
humanity.149 For this reason, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, former chair of South
Africa’s TRC, emphasized that his country could not be built anew without
repairing the individual and communal damage of apartheid.150 Drawing upon
theological and human rights precepts, reparative justice meant reintegration of
the community, and reintegration meant “affirming the legitimacy of victims’
claims [along with reparations to] bring back into the polity those who had
concluded that this government has nothing to offer them.”151 Reintegration
also meant bringing back those who atoned for heinous crimes—those who
confessed, expressed contrition, and offered restitution.152 The aim was a
functioning, new or restored community.153
147

Id. (noting that ubuntu is the “Xhosa phrase ‘ubuntu ungamntu ngabanye abantu,’
which means ‘people are people through other people’”).
148
See id. (explaining that “unlike rugged individualism, the centerpiece of Western
culture, ubuntu values relations between humans: the spirit of sharing, of collectivism, of
mutuality”).
149
Tina Rosenberg, Recovering from Apartheid, NEW YORKER, November 18, 1996, at
90 (quoting Tutu); see also Mark Gevisser, Profile: Tutu’s Test of Faith, AFRICA NEWS
SERVICE, April 12, 1996 (quoting Tutu’s description of ubuntu: “you must do what you
can to maintain this great harmony, which is perpetually undermined by resentment,
anger, desire for vengeance. That’s why African jurisprudence is restorative rather than
retributive”).
150
Harold Wells, Theology of Reconciliation, in THE RECONCILIATION OF PEOPLES:
CHALLENGE TO THE CHURCHES 30, 38 (Greg Baum & Harold Wells eds., 1997);
Gevisser, supra note 149 (quoting Tutu’s description of ubuntu).
151
Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.C.-L.L. REV. 323, 391 (1987).
152
Guided by ubuntu and political pragmatism, South African President Nelson Mandela both
exhorted and cautioned that the survival of many South African groups was dependent on,
to an important extent, reconciliation with the others. See generally YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL
JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 165-66. The transitional South African constitution, entitled
“National Unity and Reconciliation,” reflected this perspective. Id. The interim constitution’s
post-amble envisioned healing among racial groups as a key to the peaceful coexistence of South
Africans: “There is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation
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1. Communitar ian Ethos
Ubuntu thus shaped South Africa’s reparative efforts through notions of coresponsibility, interdependence, and enjoyment of rights by all.154 More
broadly, those notions generally embrace communitarian theory that
envisions citizens gathering to assess their condition and “cultivate
solidarity and civic engagement”.155 A communitarian approach through
law and politics strives to build or rebuild communities, both physically and
through a sense of connectedness and belonging.156 Cast in this aspirational
but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not victimization.” Id. In light of apartheidinflicted social wounds, the post-amble stressed that “national unity, the well-being of all
South Africans and peace required reconciliation between the people of South Africa.” Id.
Taking a cue from the post-amble, South Africa’s judiciary embraced ubuntu and
reconciliation as part of South African constitutional jurisprudence. Id. Linking social inclusion
to healing, the South Africa Supreme Court highlighted South Africa’s need in the rebuilding
process to integrate into the polity those marginalized by apartheid. Id.
153
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
154
See generally YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 165-66.
155
Michael Sandel, a leading exponent of communitarian theory, maintains that public
spaces, where citizens can gather and interpret their condition to “cultivate solidarity and
civic engagement,” unify a community and create a stronger society. See MICHAEL
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 349-50 (1996) (describing communitarian theory).
Creating public spaces, like the TRC did in South Africa, allows parties to “weave the
various strands of their identity to a coherent whole.” Id. These narratives allow people to
“make sense of their condition and interpret the common life they share” and to move
forward collectively. Id.; see also AMITAI ETZONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY 254-55
(1993).
156
The communitarian framework for reconciliation identifies several characteristics of a
complex society in conflict.
(1) historical wrongs committed by one group, (2) which harmed, and continue
to harm, both the material living conditions and psychological outlook of
another group, (3) which, in turn, has damaged present-day relations between
the groups, and (4) which ultimately has damaged the larger community,
resulting in divisiveness, distrust, social disease-a breach in the polity. Within
this framework, reparations by the polity and for the polity are justified on
moral and political grounds-healing social wounds by bringing back into the
community those wrongly excluded.
Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 477, 522 (1998-99);
see also ETZONI, supra note 155, at 247 (“[Communitarianism is a] social movement
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fashion, reconciliation initiatives aim to achieve social harmony in societies
marred by painful past conflict.157 Through “collective acts of public
apology and forgiveness, reparation and restoration are imparted and the
writhing conflict of the past is substituted for by the ‘overlapping
consensus’ of community.”158
Generally stated, the communitarian ethos links to human rights norms of
reparative justice.159 This ethos shapes reconciliation initiatives through
aim[ed] at shoring up the moral, social, and political environment. Part change of heart,
part renewal of social bonds, part reform of public life.”); Bar-Tal & Bennink, supra note
145, at 33.
157
See supra Section II (describing various global reconciliation initiatives).
158
Alexander Keller Hirsch, Introduction: The Agony of Reconciliation, in THEORIZING
POST CONFLICT RECONCILIATION: AGONISM, RESTITUTION AND REPAIR 1 (Alexander
Keller Hirsch ed., 2012). Prophetic theology, in concert with communitarian political
theory, also undergirds some reconciliation initiatives, South Africa’s in particular. See
generally Wells, supra note 150; DONALD W. SHRIVER, AN ETHIC FOR ENEMIES (1995);
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., STRENGTH OF LOVE (1963); CORNEL WEST, PROPHESY AND
DELIVERANCE (1982); THE KAIROS COVENANT (Willis H. Logan ed.,1988); JAMES
CONE, BLACK THEOLOGY AND BLACK POWER (1969).
159
Reparative justice is deeply rooted in international human rights norms that not only
seek to prevent gross violations but also to repair the damage already inflicted. The 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mandates that anyone whose human
rights have been violated “shall have an effective remedy.” International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), at 52, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16,
art. 2(3), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Mar. 23, 1976). Effective remedies for human rights
violations shape reparative justice through reparations that “involve restitution,
rehabilitation, and measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public memorials,
guarantees of non-repetition, and changes to relevant laws and practices.” See Oscar
Schachter, The Obligation to Implement the Covenant in Domestic Law, in
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
325 (Louise Henkin ed., 1981) (describing the range of potentially “effective remedies”
for human rights violations); Ignacio Alvarez et al., Conference: Reparations in the InterAmerican System: A Comparative Approach, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1375, 1386 (2007)
(describing a wide range of non-monetary reparative measures).
In 2005, the United Nations Human Rights Commission approved the “Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Gross
Violations of Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law.” C.H.R. Res. 2005/35, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.11 (Apr. 19, 2005). The
human rights “Basic Principles and Guidelines” specify forms of reparative justice, aimed
at social healing, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and guarantees of
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engagement by all with some role in human rights transgressions in
fashioning a more inclusive community.160 It also encourages joint
construction of a new, unifying justice narrative—from multiple, oftendissonant narratives—about the causes and consequences of the conflict.161
Finally, it uplifts the significance of conflicting groups’ commitment to
peaceable and possibly productive future relations.162
2. A Cr itique of Reconciliation’s Communitar ian Ethos
A primary critique of reconciliation’s communitarian underpinnings
emerges from recent academic debates. That critique, agonism, finds that
communitarian values tend to serve majoritarian interests by skewing
characterization of the injustice and remedial needs in ways that most
non-repetition. See Cunneen, supra note 52 (broadly addressing approaches to reparative
justice emphasizing reconstruction and reparation).
Restitution means restoring a victim to the original situation, such as return of
property, while rehabilitation includes medical and psychological care as well
as legal and social services. Satisfaction compromises several possible
measures: from apologies, full and public disclosure of the truth, and victim
commemoration, to judicial and administrative sanctions. Guarantees of nonrepetition are equally varied, including legal reform and human rights training
programs.
Thomas M. Antkowiak, A Dark Side: The Inter-American Court and Reparations for
Indigenous Peoples, DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 7, 9 (2014); see also Dinah Shelton, The
United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Reparations: Context and Contents, in OUT
OF ASHES: REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS AND SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS 11 (K. De Feyter et al. eds., 2005).
160
See generally Bar-Tal & Bennink, supra note 145, at 21.
161
Id.
162
See generally id.; COLLEEN MURPHY, A MORAL THEORY OF POLITICAL
RECONCILIATION (2010) (analyzing the moral problems of political relationships already
under the strain of civil conflict and repression and identifying the types of repair and
transformation needed); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward a Jurisprudence of Law, Peace,
Justice, and a Tilt Toward Non-Violence and Empathetic Means of Human Problem
Solving, UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 79 (2012-2013); Nick Smith, Just Apologies:
An Overview of the Philosophical Issues, 13 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 35 (2013); Rachel
Lopez, The (Re)Collection of Memory After Mass Atrocity and the Dilemma for
Transitional Justice, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 799 (2015).
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benefit those with the largest places at the reconciliation table.163 And the
call for communitarian social harmony tends to obscure, or even erase, the
conflict’s still-contested history and consequences.164
Agonist theory posits the impossibility of genuine consensus in a
complex society and views a reconciliation mandate of societal harmony as
dangerously exclusionary.165 An overriding goal of harmony drowns out
dissenting voices and perpetuates repression of those of lesser power, not as
part of the original transgression, but later in attempting to rectify it.166
When assertive minorities are labeled uncooperative and, therefore,
detrimental to harmony, they are quickly dismissed, or even excluded, from
reparative processes.167
Agonist theory thus seeks to reconceive reconciliation not along purely
communitarian lines but as a deliberate accommodation of perpetual
conflict in a multidimensional society.168 The theory aims to enable groups
163

See generally Hirsch, supra note 100, at 1-6; Muldoon, supra note 102. Other
branches of political theory critique are rhetorical and narrative. See, e.g., Doxtader,
supra note 102, at 268; Ross, supra note 102, at 210.
164
See Hirsch, supra note 100, at 3; accord Bashir, supra note 100, at 48-49 (“[T]he task
of accommodation is made even more difficult when there are not only diversities of
values, languages, cultures, and identities, but also persistent and unresolved issues of
historical injustice.”). But see Philip Selznick, Communitarian Jurisprudence, in TO
PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE: A COMMUNITARIAN READER 3 (David E. Carney
ed., 1999) (“A communitarian ethos calls for integration, but also demands protection of
diversity and reconciliation of interests . . . The most important expression of civility is
the virtue we call justice. Justice speaks civilly to the inevitable diversity of passions and
interest. Differences are adjudicated, not erased.”); James A. Gardner, Federalism and
the Problem of Political Subcommunities, in TO PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE: A
COMMUNITARIAN READER 295 (David E. Carney ed., 1999) (“Communitarianism . . .
sees the self as situated in . . . the social conditions which it finds itself, yet capable
through personal reflection and dialogic engagement with others of thinking critically, if
not transcendentally, about its goals, its moral views, and ultimately its own identity.”).
165
Jonathan R. Cohen, Coping with Lasting Social Injustice, 13 WASH. & LEE J. CIV.
RTS. & SOC. JUST. 259, 268-69 (2007).
166
See id.
167
See id. at 268-69.
168
See Little, supra note 99, at 198.
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to exist peaceably in the same polity amid tensions and conflict, rather than
to compel groups to try unsuccessfully to leave behind the painful past.169 It
endorses differences “that cannot simply be managed, forgotten, or
transcended and a commitment to equality that resists the kinds of seamless
narratives of national belonging that have been so effective at silencing
[minority] claims.”170 At bottom, it promotes conflictual engagement in
hopes of producing a new society born and sustained amid discord.171
B. Basic Structure
In light of marked differences among initiatives, a singular, universally
accepted reconciliation structure does not exist.172 Nevertheless, a basic,
generally recognized reconciliation structure emerges. That structure—the
prevailing template—tracks South Africa’s truth and reconciliation
process.173 Its path-forging Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
anchored the negotiated peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy.174
Inspired by Nelson Mandela and chaired by Archbishop Tutu, South
Africa’s legislatively created TRC significantly advanced social healing by

169

See Bashir Bashir & Will Kymlicka, Introduction: Struggles for Inclusion and
Reconciliation in Modern Democracies, in THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 1-24 (Will Kymlicka & Bashir Bashir eds., 2008).
170
Balfour, supra note 99, at 96. See also Little, supra note 99, at 198.
171
See Cohen, supra note 165, at 268-69.
172
See generally Bashir & Kymlicka, supra note 169.
173
See Yehudith Auerbach, The Role of Forgiveness in Reconciliation, in FROM
CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RECONCILIATION 149 (Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov ed., 2004)
(describing attempts to “redress past injustice and bring about peace within torn
societies” and citing the “best known example of . . . a truth commission is in South
Africa initiated by Nelson Mandela with the blessing of Desmond Tutu”).
174
See generally Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104. The National Party—
composed exclusively of white South Africans—only agreed to give up military power if
there was a process that granted whites amnesty and allowed them to keep their property.
See id.
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acknowledging historic and persistent suffering and initiating reparative
programs.175
Three overlapping committees opened paths toward social healing.176
One committee focused on truth telling by investigating the gross human
rights violations and by hearing the stories of those harmed.177 Another
committee considered amnesty for those who confessed to political
crimes.178 A third recommended forms of economic justice.179 Together
they set the stage for the tripartite structure of reconciliation initiatives
globally.180
Significantly, South Africa’s TRC signaled to the world that, in response
to historic injustices, there “is a need for understanding, but not for
175

See Kenneth Christie, South African Truth Commission Performs Vital Rule, STRAITS
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1996, at 39.
176
Alexandra Zavis, Panel Faces Truth, Fear, and Anger: Apartheid’s Past Is
Confronted, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar. 2, 1996, at 23; Arno Mayer, South Africa
Begins Digesting the Apartheid Era, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Dec. 3, 1995.
177
See John Battersby, South Africans Weigh Exposing Apartheid Crimes, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, May 18, 1994, at 1 (describing how the TRC aims to foster healing
through storytelling and amnesty).
178
See id. (describing how the TRC aims to foster healing through storytelling and
amnesty); Rosenberg, supra note 149, at 87.
179
See John Yeld, Apartheid Profiteers ‘Must Pay Reparation,’ AFRICA NEWS SERVICE,
May 12, 1997; TRC to Host Forum on Economic Justice and Reconciliation, SOUTH
AFRICAN PRESS ASS., Mar. 14, 1997.
180
See Desmond Tutu, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, South Africa (TRC),
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Truth-andReconciliation-Commission-South-Africa (describing how South Africa’s TRC “attracted
global attention, as it was the first commission to hold public hearings in which both
victims and perpetrators were heard.” Additionally, because South Africa’s TRC took a
different approach from the Nuremberg Trials, the TRC was “hailed as an innovative
model for building peace and justice and for holding accountable those guilty of human
rights violations.” Id. Since the South Africa TRC, “[m]any other countries dealing with
postconflict issues have instituted similar methodologies for such commissions.” Id. See
also South Africa: Impunity, supra note 134 (describing South Africa’s TRC as
“something of a poster child for transitional justice”). Cf. Luciana Bertoia, ‘The Model Is
Argentina, Not South Africa,’ BUENOS AIRES HERALD (Oct. 19, 2014),
http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/172513/’the-model-is-argentina-not-southafrica’ (positing that Argentina’s TRC is the prevailing model, not South Africa’s).
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vengeance, a need for reparation, but not for retaliation.”181 For the TRC,
healing individuals, communities, and society182 entailed both truth-telling
and material changes in social, economic, and political institutions.183
More broadly, the TRC focused on ways to repair the persisting damage
to people (physical, psychological, and financial), communities (schools,
businesses, housing, infrastructure, and healthcare), and society (divisions,
guilt, shame, and lack of moral standing).184 Drawing from communitarian
philosophy, many supporters of South Africa’s TRC believed that its
investigation and recommendations would lead to institutional changes and
eventually to new communities marked by racial equality.185
In sum, the prevailing reconciliation template featured three practical
steps: (1) the country creates a truth-seeking commission to address past or
ongoing injustice186—investigating atrocities and hearing victim stories—
and to make findings of responsibility and recommendations for reparative
action;187 (2) the judiciary or a tribunal rules on either criminal prosecution
or amnesty;188 and (3) the executive and legislative branches undertake
181

Robert Block, Apartheid Sinners Confront the Truth, THE INDEPENDENT (London),
May 19, 1995, at 14; see Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, 1 IOWA J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 50 (1997) (quoting Justice Minister Dullah Omar, an author of the Reconciliation
Legislation).
182
See supra Sections II & IV.A.
183
See supra Sections II, III & IV.A.
184
See supra Sections II & IV.A.
185
See generally Adrien K. Wing, Towards Democracy in a New South Africa, 16 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 689 (1995) (describing the transition from apartheid to a constitutional
democracy); Rosenberg, supra note 149, at 87.
186
See INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, RECONCILIATION
AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: A HANDBOOK 122-40 (David Bloomfield et al. eds., 2003),
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/Reconciliation-After-Violent-Conflict-AHandbook-Full-English-PDF.pdf (explaining that “one of the most popular transitional
mechanisms in recent years is. . . the truth commission”).
187
See id. at 125.
188
See id. at 97-111 (noting that “reconciliation processes are ineffective as long as the
vicious circle of impunity is not broken”); Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Dialectics Between
Stable Peace and Reconciliation, in FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RECONCILIATION
65, 74 (Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov ed., 2004) (observing that “new beliefs should refer to
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reconstructive and reparative implementing actions189 based on the
commission’s recommendations.190
1. Tr uth Seeking
The reconciliation template’s first step, and the heart of a truth
commission’s hands-on work, is “to seek the truth about past abuses in
order to recognize the dignity of victims, uphold human rights, and
contribute to social change.”191 The commission’s truth seeking serves
multiple aims, and truth itself has several meanings: a forensic or factual
truth, a personal or narrative truth, and a healing and restorative truth.192
The key to this first step is public testimony to commissioners and,
through media, to local and global audiences. South Africa’s truth-telling
the conflict with more objective attitudes, and even with self-criticism that includes
recognition of one’s responsibility for the misdeeds throughout the conflict and
acceptance that both sides are victims of the conflict”).
189
See supra Section II (detailing the last two of the 4Rs in the social healing through
justice framework).
190
See INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 186, at
145-61. The International Center for Transitional Justice acknowledges that an
“idealized, legalistic model” would place these three steps (truth telling,
prosecution/amnesty, and reconstruction/reparation) “in parallel, because reparations,
truth seeking, and criminal justice respond to specific victims’ rights that are demanded
immediately.” González et al., supra note 26, at 90. The reality, however, reflects that
accountability, and more broadly social healing, is a “long-term process in which each
transitional justice measure will have stages of different intensity and where different
institutions will establish sequences with one another, sometimes causally.” See id. The
prevailing model, then, accounts for this reality where truth telling is more of a first step
followed by prosecutions/amnesty and reparation/reconstruction.
191
Kofi Annan, Foreword to Challenging the Conventional: Can Truth Commissions
Strengthen Peace Processes?, INT’L CENTER TRANSITIONAL JUST. 1, 1 (June 2014),
https://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Report-KAF-TruthCommPeace-2014.pdf; see also
Nadim N. Rouhana, Reconciling History and Equal Citizenship in Israel: Democracy and
the Politics of Historical Denial, in THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 75 (Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir, eds., 2008)
(emphasizing the importance of truth revelation and rejection of historical denial).
192
See TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, TRUTH
AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA VOL. 1, at 110 (1998),
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report.
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committee enabled victims to recount stories of horrific politically motivated
violence, including imprisonment, torture, rape, and neighborhood
destruction.193 By creating a receptive forum and documenting and
disseminating victim accounts, the TRC helped generate “a new global
‘truth’ about the personal horrors of apartheid through cathartic victim
storytelling.”194
South Korea’s TRCK also encouraged truth telling, although through a
more staid process in which victims submitted individual applications,
investigators examined claims, and commissioners made determinations
about the “truth.”195 The TRCK received 11,174 applications, confirmed the
facts of 8,468 claims, and published seven interim reports and a 1,100 page
final report.196 The TRCK extended its investigation into causes, reviewing
193

See Suzanne Daley, Apartheid Torturer Testifies, As Evil Shows Its Banal Face, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 9, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/09/world/apartheid-torturertestifies-as-evil-shows-its-banal-face.html?pagewanted=all (describing the stories told by
both the victims and the perpetrators of the Apartheid atrocities); Yamamoto &
Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 9.
194
Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 12; see also Yamamoto et al., supra note
24, at 47; Jasmine Wright, South Africa Frees Apartheid-Era Death Squad Leader ‘Prime
Evil,’ PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/southafrica-frees-notorious-apartheid-era-killer-prime-evil/ (describing how Eugene de Kock’s
pending release from prison serves as an interest in national reconciliation, despite his
prosecution, conviction, and prison sentence for twenty years).
195
Kim, supra note 88, at 125, 142-44, 163 (noting that the TRCK announced “state
responsibility” for 1,340 civil deaths from the Yeosu-Suncheon Revolt in 2010 and
confirmed cases from the Korean War in 2009). According to Professor Kim, however,
the TRCK focused on factual or forensic truth, rather than “personal or narrative truth,
social or ‘dialogue’ truth, and healing and restorative truth.” Id. at 163. Because of this, it
failed to construct a single overarching historical narrative. Id. For Kim, this is the
fundamental reason why the TRCK recommendations and implementation of those
recommendations were insufficient. Id. See also TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH
KOREA: BETWEEN THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE KOREAN WARS (Jae-Jung Suh ed.,
2013) (describing the truth and reconciliation efforts in South Korea after the Korean
War).
196
See Kim, supra note 88, at 152 (detailing that out of the applications received, “290
cases were related to the independence movement, 8,175 to civilian massacres, and 2,709
to human rights abuses” by either South Korea or South Korea’s enemies); see also Truth
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confidential government files and conducting interviews with officials and
witnesses to generate a forensic truth.197
Some perceive the truth-revealing component of a reconciliation
initiative to be of paramount importance.198 The International Center for
Transitional Justice observes, “more and more commissions are being
created with the expectation that their foremost task” is truth revelation.199
Others are more cautious, even critical. Human rights scholar Tara Melish
cites unrealistic assumptions about the effect of victim testimonies.200 She
notes that some “presuppose a direct causal connection between truthtelling and the broader goals of transitional justice, uncritically concluding
that the public airing of truths about the past will in fact bring about
institutional learning, official acknowledgement, and social healing, causing
victims and perpetrators to come together in reconciliation and
forgiveness.”201 Instead, Melish posits that broader civil society and
institutional actors must actively and persistently pursue reconciliation
beyond initial testimonies to engender real transformation.202 From this
vantage point, truth telling is a crucial first step, but only one step, toward
genuine reconciliation.
Commission: South Korea 2005, U.S. INST. OF PEACE (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-south-korea-2005.
197
See Kim, supra note 88, at 152 (noting that the TRCK could “issue a warrant to call
witnesses for an interview and investigation” but that a warrant lacked “strong
enforcement mechanisms, with only a fine not exceeding 10 million won for
noncompliance (8,800 USD)”).
198
See INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 186, at
122-40 (noting that “historical accounting via truth-telling is one of the most important
steps in the reconciliation process”). See also Bar-Tal & Bennink, supra note 145, at 208.
199
González et al., supra note 26, at xii.
200
Tara J. Melish, Truth Commissions Impact: A Participation-Based Implementation
Agenda, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 273, 279-81 (2012).
201
Id. As discussed later, Melish’s assessment calling for more active civil society
engagement as the answer to truth commission shortcomings is itself narrow and, in
important ways, shortsighted. See infra notes 371-72 and accompanying text.
202
Melish, supra note 200, at 279.
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2. Cr iminal Pr osecution or Amnesty
The reconciliation template’s second step seeks acknowledgement of
malfeasance through either prosecution and punishment or amnesty in
exchange for confessions of political crimes.203 After the Cold War, many
governments

and

international

organizations

created

new

justice

frameworks to deal with the consequences of violence.204 Colombia’s
national courts, for instance, developed new criminal law standards that
were more stringent than international human rights norms.205 By contrast,
the United Nations-backed international and hybrid criminal tribunals
adjudicated, albeit slowly, accountability for atrocities in the Balkans,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Lebanon, and beyond.206
203

Some truth and reconciliation processes, however, skip this step because the truth
commissions lack legal authority from constricted mandates. See, e.g., Kim, supra note
111, at 106 (discussing South Korea’s TRCK structure). South Korea’s TRCK, for
instance, “had no authority to punish perpetrators, even when they were positively
identified and their wrongdoing plainly established.” See id. It also did not have authority
“to offer immunity to alleged perpetrators in exchange for their testimony or confessions,
as had been done in the case of South Africa’s TRC.” Id.
204
Tolbert, supra note 21.
205
See Annan, supra note 191, at xi. Colombia’s “human rights defenders [therefore]
make extensive use of litigation.” Id. The Colombia government also recently
acknowledged that negotiations with opposition forces almost certainly contemplate “the
prosecution of those most responsible for international crimes.” Id.
206
Most of these international courts, including the International Criminal Court, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, and the Appeals Chambers of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, are
located in The Hague, Netherlands. See About the Court, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2016);
About the ICTY, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/about (last visited Nov. 15, 2016); The ICTR in
Brief, UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS,
http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal (last visited Nov. 15, 2016); About the STL, SPECIAL
TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl (last visited Nov. 15,
2016). Other hybrid tribunals, including the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, are located within the countries
where the atrocities occurred. See SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: RESIDUAL
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.rscsl.org/index.html (last visited Nov.
15, 2016); About ECCC, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA,
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Special

prosecutor

investigations

sometimes

adequately

address

significant issues for a post-conflict society, including political violence,
economic exploitation, and corruption.207 Negotiated peaceful transitions,
however, sometimes require the political compromise of amnesty—an
effective pardon for political crimes publically confessed.208 African
National Congress’ leaders finally agreed to amnesty as part of the future
South Africa TRC process when they realized that amnesty was a key
sticking point in the negotiated peaceful transition to democracy.209 The
only other option envisioned by those leaders: ramped up violent
confrontations with the White National Party controlling the military.210
The South Africa TRC’s amnesty committee administered the amnesty
compromise by insisting on perpetrators’ full, detailed political confessions
on the public record.211 The amnesty committee created a highly structured
public forum for truth knowing that might not have otherwise

https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/about-eccc (last visited Nov. 15, 2016). And the
International Criminal Court, with jurisdiction over 122 member states, considers cases
referred to it by the governments or the United Nations Security Council. See About the
Court, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, supra.
207
Annan, supra note 191.
208
See INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 186, at 97111.
209
See Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 10.
210
See id.
211
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, SOUTH AFRICA HIST. ONLINE,
http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/truth-and-reconciliation-commission-trc (last visited
Feb. 11, 2015). The amnesty committee “was empowered to grant amnesty to those
charged with atrocities during Apartheid as long as two conditions were met: The crimes
were politically motivated and the entire and whole truth was told by the person seeking
amnesty.” Id.; see Truth Seeking: Elements of Creating an Effective Truth Commission,
INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 12 (Eduardo González & Howard Varney eds., 2013),
http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Book-Truth-Seeking-2013-English.pdf (noting that
South Africa’s TRC “allowed victims to participate in amnesty proceedings where
perpetrators confessed their crimes” and “encouraged several instances of direct contact
between victims’ groups and offenders in an attempt to foster dialogue and
understanding”).
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materialized.212 And it compelled wrongdoers to assume an important
degree of moral responsibility213—but at the expense of criminal law
accountability.214
For this latter reason, some point to amnesty as an anathema to victim
healing,215 saying it neglects victims’ need for criminal justice.216 Moreover,
they warn that amnesty proponents mistakenly “try to legitimize [amnesty]
by pointing to the [South Africa TRC] experience . . . as a so-called
‘tradeoff of rights’” but with a “warped and partial understanding of the
complex mechanism used in that context and its consequences.”217
Others cast a skeptical eye on criminal prosecutions. The International
Center for Transitional Justice, for instance, challenges those who assume
that criminal prosecutions could happen regularly, let alone generate just
outcomes. International Center President Tolbert observes that international
criminal courts are “losing their momentum”218 and that national criminal
courts struggle to “address adequately troubled pasts without the support of
international

institutions,”

rendering

the

fight

for

systematically through criminal law “virtually impossible.”

212

human

rights

219

Truth Seeking, supra note 211, at 12.
See supra Sections II & IV.A (detailing the conceptual underpinnings of moral
responsibility).
214
See González et al., supra note 26, at 91.
215
In the “absence of a firm commitment to human rights, powerful spoilers may pressure
the parties to cheat victims of their rights by, for example, immunizing perpetrators
through blanket amnesties or proposing a truth commission[] in order to impede criminal
investigations.” Id.
216
See id. at xii.
217
Id.
218
David Tolbert highlighted the lack of international community support, mounting
pressure, and slowing momentum stems partly from the reality that “[s]everal countries
have attacked the ICC; [and] African Union members want heads of state to be immune
from prosecution, thus undermining a fundamental principle of the court.” Tolbert, supra
note 21.
219
Id.
213
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For some, a rigorous truth-confession requirement as a precondition to
selectively conferred amnesty for political crimes reflects a path between
ineffectual large-scale criminal prosecutions on the one hand and blanket
amnesty on the other. South Africa’s TRC walked that path.220 Another
hybrid path, negotiated in Colombia in 2015 between the rebels and
government, pursued prosecutions of higher-level leaders and orchestrators
of crimes against humanity while bestowing amnesty to qualifying frontline
fighters.221 In these ways, criminal prosecution or selectively conferred
amnesty, or some hybrid, is a second step in the reconciliation template.
3. Reconstr uction and Repar ation (Including Economic J ustice)
The prevailing reconciliation template’s third step is reconstruction and
reparation. While recognition and responsibility mainly entail words and
understandings,

reconstruction

(recasting

institutions

and

formal

relationships partly to prevent recurrence of transgressions) and reparation
(repairing the damage to people and communities) require executive and
legislative (and often business) actions. Combined with words and
understandings, those reparative actions aim to generate material changes in
institutional structures and living conditions.222
Reconstructive and reparative actions might encompass presidential or
legislative apologies and commemoration projects; changes in laws to
require security force transparency and accountability in preventing abuse
repetition; changes in institutional control over public resources that affect
daily living conditions; broad-based public education and continuing human

220

See generally Yamamoto, supra note 181.
See A Big Leap Toward Peace in Colombia, ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 2015, at 37
(describing three-year negotiated peace agreement between FARC and the government,
emphasizing the hybrid amnesty-prosecution provision).
222
See generally INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, supra
note 186, at 145-48.
221
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rights research; and individual payments, economic capacity-building, and
community development.223
As part of reconstruction and reparation efforts, South Africa’s economic
justice committee, aiming to empower black South Africans, generated a
plan for immediate, long-term individual and community reparations to
address apartheid’s widespread economic damage.224 The plan responded to
“the widening gap between the rich and poor to the ‘historic benefit’
enjoyed

by

apartheid

businesses.”225

Central

to

its

plan

were

recommendations that private businesses, many of which profited greatly
from apartheid, contribute to reparations funds and broader economic
development.226
South Africa’s government initially responded proactively—it delivered
urgent interim reparations to those in dire need227 and partially improved the

223

See id.
Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 9; see also INT’L INST. FOR
DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 186, at 154. The plan consisted
of five components:
224

(a) urgent interim reparation payments for people in urgent need, to enable
them to access services and facilities; (b) individual reparation grants for each
victim of a gross human rights violation paid over a period of six years; (c)
symbolic, legal and administrative reparation measures; (d) community
rehabilitation programmes; and (e) institutional reforms.
INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 186, at 154.
Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 10.
226
Id.
227
Simon Allison, President’s Fund: Where Is the Money for Apartheid Victims Actually
Going?, DAILY MAVERICK (Oct. 14, 2014),
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-10-14-the-presidents-fund-where-is-themoney-for-asheid-victims-actually-going/.
225

More than 16,000 individuals—those who appeared before the TRC or were
named in TRC reports—were given a one-off payment of R30,000 each,
beginning in 2003. Although this is far below the amount recommended by the
TRC (which averaged out to R21,000 per person annually for six years) this
money has at least been disbursed. According to the justice department, there
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nation’s infrastructure by building roads, water works, and schools in black
communities.228 The government also enacted the Black Economic
Empowerment (BEE) legislation.229 This legislation and other postapartheid legislative economic measures sought to employ “direct
intervention in the distribution of assets and opportunities” to lessen
economic disparities.230 The BEE aimed for capacity building to “ensure
broader and meaningful participation in the economy by black people to
achieve sustainable development and prosperity.”231 And, related, the
are only 20 people yet to receive their claims, and that’s because the
department can’t find them.
Id.

228

Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 11; see also Christopher J. Colvin,
Overview of the Reparations Program in South Africa, in THE HANDBOOK OF
REPARATIONS 176, 189 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006); Eddy Maloka, Chapter 4: The Fruits
of Freedom, SOUTH AFRICAN HIST. ONLINE,
http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/chapter-4-fruits-freedom (last visited May 2, 2014)
(describing South African measures post-apartheid to improve access to water, electricity,
health care, education, and employment for black South Africans).
229
BEE has been defined as:
[A]n integrated and coherent socio-economic process. It is located within the
context of the country’s national transformation programme, namely the RDP
(Reconstruction and Development Programme). It is aimed at redressing the
imbalances of the past by seeking to substantially and equitably transfer and
confer the ownership, management and control of South Africa’s financial and
economic resources to the majority of the citizens. It seeks to ensure broader
and meaningful participation in the economy by black people to achieve
sustainable development and prosperity.
See Daron Acemoglu, Stephen Gelb & James A. Robinson, Black Economic
Empowerment and Economic Performance in South Africa, at 4 (Aug. 2007)
http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/growth/06Procurement%20and%20BEE/02BLACK%20ECONOMIC%20EMPOWERMENT%20AND%20ECONOMIC%20PERF
ORMANCE%20IN%20SO.pdf (citing 2001 BEE Commission Report, p. 2).
230
BEE was designed to “[r]edress [] the imbalances of the past by seeking to
substantially and equitably transfer and confer the ownership, management and control of
South Africa’s financial and economic resources to the majority of the citizens”—the
previously disenfranchised black population. See id.
231
See id.
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executive branch established a President’s Fund to emphasize the
importance of monetary payments to apartheid victims.232
South

Korea’s

TRCK,

too,

made

important—albeit

limited—

recommendations for reconstructive and reparative actions. These
recommendations included publicly apologizing, correcting government
records, revising history textbooks and government publications, amending
health laws, educating about human rights, supporting memorial projects,
compensating selected individuals, and retrying those wrongly convicted.233
Especially important for victims and their families, the TRCK made three
notable policy recommendations: (1) the enactment of a special law to
provide individual reparations to victims of civilian massacres during the
Korean War;234 (2) the establishment of a permanent research foundation to
further investigations and reconciliation; and (3) the proper burial of
victims’ remains after unearthing mass murder sites.235 The national
government’s elective branches undertook initial implementing actions.
C. Unfulfilled Promises
In some situations, however, including the TRCK’s, external political
influences

limit

the

breadth

232

and

depth

of

truth

commission

See Allison, supra note 227 (referencing the establishment of the “President’s Fund”
in 2005).
233
Kim, supra note 88, at 157 (explaining the recommendations were divided into four
categories, including “(1) measures to restore the honor of victims; (2) measures to
prevent the recurrence of human rights violations; (3) measures to achieve reconciliation
and to promote democracy; and (4) measures to educate about and publicize the past.”);
see also TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION: ACTIVITIES OF THE PAST THREE YEARS 33 (2009) [hereinafter THREE
YEAR REPORT]; REPUBLIC OF KOREA TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION,
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, VOL.1, PT. 1, 199-200 (2010)
[hereinafter Final TRCK Report 2010].
234
The recommendations for reparations did not cover all atrocities, an example being
Japan’s occupation of South Korea. See Kim, supra note 88.
235
Kim, supra note 88, at 157 (citing Final TRCK Report 2010); Final TRCK Report
2010, supra note 233, at 211.
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recommendations.236

Moreover,

as

previously

noted,

even

strong

commission recommendations sometimes remain largely unimplemented by
political branches and private businesses.237
Indeed, as South Africa approached 20 years post-apartheid in 2014,
former TRC chair Archbishop Tutu characterized its reconciliation process
as having “fallen tragically short.”238 Despite South Africa’s salutary initial
efforts, its entire reconciliation initiative teetered on the edge of failure.239
Tutu

cited

the

lack

of

government

recommendations as a major shortcoming.

240

follow-through

on

TRC

He lamented, “[b]y choosing

not to follow through on the commission’s recommendations, [the]
government not only compromised the commission’s contribution to the
process, but the very process itself.”241 Most important, the government’s
failure to implement TRC reparations recommendations forestalled the
sense of reconciliation achieved.242
Unfulfilled truth commission promises, particularly for economic justice,
are key indicators of incomplete, stalled, or backsliding reconciliation
initiatives.243 In Colombia, for example, the government made many
reparatory promises to the victims.
236

See infra Section V.D.2 (discussing South Korea’s TRCK).
See supra Sections II.B & III.
238
Tutu, supra note 6.
239
See id.
240
See id.
241
Id.
242
See id. (describing how the TRC’s accomplishments must be seen against “a backdrop
of a hopelessly inequitable country in which most of the rich have hung on to their
wealth, while the ‘freedom dividend’ for most of the poor has been to continue surviving
on scraps”).
243
See, e.g., Moreno, supra note 115. Importantly, this sense of “unfulfilled promises”
often stems from the overall sense of a stagnant or regressing reconciliation initiative.
Nevertheless, this sense may also come from “unrealistic expectations that are often set
for truth commissions.” González et al., supra note 26, at ix. “Raising expectations
among victims that a truth commission will solve all of their urgent demands can create
frustration and mistrust, compounding an already difficult situation. Similarly, any
237

VOLUME 15 • ISSUE 1 • 2016

162 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE
The country told [victims] that each individual crime could and
would be clarified through the justice and peace process, promised
them that the reparations process would be rapid and effective, and
also led society to believe that the criminal process would be able
to clarify the deep-rooted causes of the paramilitary
phenomenon.244
But the promises remained pending indefinitely.245 Those suffering felt
betrayed by government recalcitrance.246
For black South Africans, the combined lack of government followthrough on reparation recommendations and the private sector’s harsh
refusal to contribute to reparations funds heightened their sense of
betrayal.247 Those most damaged by apartheid continue to live in poverty
while those profiting from the decades-long oppression flourish.248 Racial
divisions remain in a newly insidious form—with whites and a sliver of

suggestion that such a body could solve all of a country’s ills only sets up the public for
disappointment.” Id.
244
Moreno, supra note 115.
245
Id.
246
See INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, “TO WALK FREELY WITH
A WIDE HEART”: A STUDY OF THE NEEDS AND ASPIRATIONS FOR REPARATIVE JUSTICE
OF VICTIMS OF CONFLICT-RELATED ABUSES IN NEPAL (2014),
http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Report-Nepal-Reparations-2014.pdf (detailing
Nepal’s victims’ continuing frustration with inadequate reparative action).
247
See supra notes 223-32 and accompanying text.
248
SA United, Despite Divisions: Report, SOUTH AFRICA.INFO (June 26, 2006),
http://www.southafrica.info/about/people/nation-making-260606.htm#.U2Q8ofldVqU
(detailing a government report released in 2006, which “stresses that economic divisions
within the country remain set along the racial fault-lines created by apartheid”); see also
Yamamoto, supra note 181, at 205 (“The fight for reparations has also had the
unfortunate consequence of sidelining the responsibility of other role players besides the
government. The complicity of foreign corporations and governments in supporting the
apartheid regime has only recently entered the discussion.”); Id. at 199 (“Jubilee South
Africa has pointed out that the multinational corporations that helped to finance the
apartheid government in its final, most repressive years removed roughly R3 billion
(US$375,000,000) a year between 1985 and 1993 from the country. Jubilee argues that if
1.5 percent of those profits was returned each year for six years, financial reparations at
the level of the original TRC recommendations could be paid.”).
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elite blacks prospering and the vast majority of blacks remaining
impoverished.249
South Africa President Jacob Zuma recognized that recommended
legislation for black economic capacity building failed to narrow the racial
divide—whites continue to earn nearly 10 times more than blacks, and
blacks are unemployed at rates five times higher than whites.250 He also
acknowledged, “instead of redistributing wealth and positions to the Black
majority, [the legislation has] resulted mainly in a few [black] individuals
benefitting a lot . . . while the leadership of most big companies [remain] in
white hands. The Black masses, the intended beneficiaries, have hardly
gained.”251 Furthermore, more than a decade after creation of the
President’s Fund, most of the funds have yet to be dispersed, and a group
representing apartheid victims has observed that new spending plans will
not necessarily benefit traumatized communities.252 According to Tutu,
249

See Lydia Polgreen, In a Divided City, Many Blacks See Echoes of White Superiority,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/africa/in-capetown-many-black-south-africans-feel-unwelcome.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(describing Cape Town as “the last bastion of white rule” where many blacks feel like
second class citizens).
250
Alford, supra note 109.
251
Id.
252
Allison, supra note 227. The justice department is now turning toward community
reparations, specifically providing health care, mental health care, education and housing.
Id. But critics point out shortcomings of the new TRC purportedly in line with previous
TRC recommendations:
[T]he limited scope of the proposal excludes the vast majority of affected
communities; that victims of Apartheid, as envisaged by the TRC, were not
consulted properly in the process of drafting the new regulations and will not
benefit directly from them; and that the type of infrastructure-heavy projects
envisaged are simply to make up for shortfall’s in the government’s own
municipal infrastructure grants (in other words, the President’s Fund should
not be used to do things that the government should be doing anyways).
Id. (citing the opinion of the Khulumani Support Group, which represents over 90,000
victims of Apartheid). Allison also notes that the justice department, in its plan for
community reparations risks, “fail[ed] to adhere to the spirit of the TRC’s
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“most of the rich have hung on to their wealth, while the ‘freedom
dividend’ for most of the poor has been to continue surviving on scraps.”253
With lurching economic advances for a few, but not economic justice for
all, some now feel that the new democratic South Africa government has
forgotten its promises to the people.
Being forgotten and overlooked is very painful. The government
here has not followed through on its promise to look after the
soldiers and activists who sacrificed their youth, their education
and often their lives for the struggle. [The government and private
businesses] make promise after promise, but never deliver and I
and my fellow forgotten soldiers are still left in poverty.254
Myriad obstacles plague “a[n apparently] hopelessly inequitable
country.”255 Indeed, many now view the entire reconciliation initiative as
“falling well short of the goal of national unity through social healing.”256
For Archbishop Tutu, what is needed is something that might “offer South
recommendations, and is in danger of abusing [the] mandate to manage the President’s
Fund.” Id.
253
Tutu, supra note 6. Tutu describes the current situation in South Africa as follows:
But, today, as we reflect on the commission’s contribution to re-weaving the
fabric of our society, we do so against a backdrop of appalling violence being
perpetrated, especially against women and children across our country. We do
so against a backdrop of a hopelessly inequitable country in which most of the
rich have hung on to their wealth, while the “freedom dividend” for most of
the poor has been to continue surviving on scraps. We do so against the
backdrop of an education system that is failing to prepare our youth adequately
to contribute to their own and our nation’s development. We do so against the
backdrop of the Marikana massacre and of the public protector’s report into
the obscene spending on our president’s property in Nkandla. We do so against
the backdrop of a dearth of magnanimity and accountability and ethical
incorruptibility.
Id.

254
Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 11 (quoting a former African National
Congress soldier).
255
Tutu, supra note 6 (quoting Tutu’s description of the current state of South Africa).
256
Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 12.
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Africa society as a whole a systematic way of re-visiting [what is yet to be
accomplished] and dealing with [repairing the damage] of the apartheid
years and of entrenching a human rights culture.”257
As developed earlier, these kinds of unfulfilled promises mark nearly all
truth and reconciliation efforts throughout the world—from the United
States to Canada, South Korea, Columbia, Peru, Kenya, and beyond. What
is needed, we submit, is a conceptually sound and practically and politically
grounded new implementation fourth step in the reconciliation process.

V. THE PROPOSAL: A NEW FOURTH STEP FOR ASSESSMENT,
IMPLEMENTATION, AND OVERSIGHT
As mentioned, none of the prevailing reconciliation template’s three steps
directly

addresses

mechanisms

for

guiding

and

overseeing

the

implementation of truth commission recommendations. This missing piece
is significant because at times politics and economics generate vastly
inconsistent, incomplete, or even regressive implementing actions. The
prevailing template also does not account for the reality that truth
commission recommendations themselves sometimes are truncated, missing
meaningful recommendations for needed economic justice and institutional
restructuring.
A. The Need for a Structured Follow-up
The prevailing reconciliation template, then, provides structurally
incomplete guidance for ongoing social healing controversies. Some,
therefore, are beginning to urge the retooling of the theoretical
reconciliation framework to better account for practical on-the-ground
realities.258
257

Yamamoto & Serrano, supra note 31, at 496.
González et al., supra note 26, at 2. (questioning “is it possible that in spite of the
caveats against the automatic application of best practices, drafters and other stakeholders
258
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What is needed to help bridge the chasm between aspiration and
realization is this: a structured implementation fourth step in the expanded
reconciliation template. Described more fully below, this envisioned fourth
step would be an independent yet politically attuned follow-up body to
assess and update existing recommendations, implement outstanding
recommendations, and refashion and oversee future reconstructive and
reparative actions to further comprehensive and enduring social healing.259
This envisioned new fourth step is in its incipient stages of development.
Scholars and human rights observers are starting to explore it in depth. In
2014, Professor Eric K. Yamamoto and Miyoko Pettit laid a conceptual
foundation for fourth step implementing and oversight bodies generally and
supported a concrete proposal for these types of bodies to foster a path
forward in the partially stalled South Korea “Jeju Tragedy” reconciliation
initiative.260
In 2011, the Buffalo Human Rights Law Review convened scholars to
examine

the

need

for

reconciliation

specifically for South Korea.

261

implementation

mechanisms

Human rights scholar Tara Melish

highlighted the global need for a “permanent-follow up and orchestration
mechanism” to “oversee and independently report on follow-up initiatives,
both by government and broader civil society groups.”262 In assessing
significant shortcomings of South Korea’s 2005 TRCK, Professor Hun Joon
Kim concluded that the reconciliation initiative considered but failed to
fully operationalize mechanisms for implementing the commission’s

pay more attention to what appears to be international standards than to realities on the
ground?”).
259
See Yamamoto et al., supra note 24, at 43-46.
260
See id. at 43-80.
261
See Melish, supra note 2, at 1 (introducing the law review’s symposium on the
implementation of truth and reconciliation commission findings and recommendations
for South Korea).
262
Id. at 65-66.
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recommendations.263 For Kim, a permanent research foundation would have
been a needed next step.264 Melish characterized this research foundation as
“a permanent follow-up body to the TRCK to take forward its work and to
focus on implementation of its recommendations.”265 The TRCK’s
Framework Act contemplated a similar body that never became fully
operational.266
Kim’s permanent research foundation and Melish’s “permanent followup and orchestration mechanism”267 were generally cast more as ideas than
conceptually developed proposals.268 They did, nevertheless, signal an
incipient call for a fourth step mechanism, highlighting the need for
something more than truth commission recommendations and initial
government responses.
Others, too, perceive the limitations of the prevailing reconciliation
model and call for something more. The ICTJ acknowledged that “truth
commissions can contribute toward the implementation of victims’ rights,
but the full implementation . . . is beyond the reach of most truth
commissions.”269 Other follow up means are needed for governments and
TRC participants to respond to unfulfilled promises.270
These broad suggestions, along with the principles underlying social
healing through justice, inform the suggested new structured fourth step in
the reconciliation process, first in concept and then in operation. None of
this would come easily in practice. A follow-through fourth step in the
reconciliation process would be fraught with challenge. What is suggested

263

Kim, supra note 88, at 162-63.
Id.
265
Melish, supra note 2, at 22.
266
Id. at 22.
267
Id. at 65.
268
Id.
269
González et al., supra note 26, at 91.
270
Moreno, supra note 115.
264
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here is not a polished model for post-commission implementation but rather
an initially grounded salvo to accelerate its development.
B. A New Fourth Step in Concept
Drawn from the work of justice practitioners and scholars, the needed
fourth step is an independent Assessment, Implementation, and Oversight
Task Force with four main functions: (1) convening stakeholders in a
collaborative ongoing follow-up process; (2) assessing truth commission
report

findings

and

recommendations

and

updating

existing

recommendations; (3) shepherding implementation of original or newly
updated recommendations; and (4) extending or refashioning and then
overseeing next reparative steps in light of evolving political, social, and
economic conditions.
This follow-up body would be best “taken into explicit account at the
[initiative’s] design stage.”271 It could also be fashioned after a truth
commission completes its work, while the legislative and executive
branches undertake implementing actions. In concept, the body would
operate with a significant degree of independence. Inevitable realpolitik
influences, however, mean that the extent of the body’s actual independence
would likely turn on its originating structure (composition and balance of
decision-making power), its transparency (observer scrutiny), and the
convergence of interests (among stakeholders) in the social healing
enterprise.
1. An Assessment, Implementation, and Over sight Body
With this in mind, a fourth step follow-up Assessment, Implementation,
and Oversight Task Force would entail mutual engagement by all major
actors—government and private organization representatives, victim
survivors and families, local community representatives, businesses, and
271

See Melish, supra note 2, at 19.
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researchers. Journalists, scholars, and civil rights and human rights
organizations

might

productively

participate

as

observers

and

commentators. The Task Force would “include spaces for broad stakeholder
participation, ensuring that multiple spaces of leverage and information
collection are available to local actors involved in implementation and
follow-up work.”272 More broadly, the Task Force would address the critical
importance of active government and civil society engagement and
entrepreneurship in following up on unimplemented recommendations.
These follow-ups would include collecting and disseminating data and
generating and employing assessment indicators for perpetual monitoring,
all with an eye toward bolstering accountability.273
In light of these considerations, executive or legislative action would
legitimize government participation in the Task Force.274 Additionally,
national and local governments along with businesses and foundations
could jointly fund Task Force operations, potentially through lump sum
grants to a non-profit organization that houses and administers
operations.275 As discussed below, formal government approval of the
fourth step body, along with participation by victim representatives working
with officials, businesses, and community groups, would be essential.
272

Id. at 66.
Id. at 63.
274
See Yamamoto et al., supra note 24, at 43 n.203.
275
See id. at 44. Cf. Morocco Still a Model for Justice in MENA, but Questions Remain,
INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.ictj.org/news/morocco-stillmodel-justice-mena-questions-remain (noting that the National Council on Human Rights
(CNDH), which is a national institution for the protection and promotion of human rights,
is responsible for following up on the Equity and Reconciliation Commission’s
recommendations and is expected to issue a final report on the implementation of
recommendations and unresolved cases in 2016); Danesius Marteh, Justice Experts Slate
Ellen’s TRC Report Implementation, FRONT PAGE AFRICA (Jan. 27, 2016),
http://www.frontpageafricaonline.com/index.php/news/7343-transitional-justice-expertsslate-ellen-s-trc-report-implementation (stating that the Independent National Human
Rights Commission, a government-created commission, “has prime responsibility for
implementing the Truth & Reconciliation Commission report”).
273
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Control by a government agency, however, by locating the Task Force
under a bureaucratic agency, would tend to impede proper functioning.
Government officials need to participate in, but not control, Task Force
endeavors. Achieving the delicate balance of public and private support and
participation while ensuring a key measure of Task Force independence
would be crucial to effective follow-up operations.276
2. Goals
The Task Force’s five main goals would be:
(1) building upon the truth commission’s inquiry (which would
likely have been completed earlier and possibly without all
responsible parties’ full participation) by updating and by filling
any gaps in commission findings;
(2) assessing the completeness, fairness, and efficacy of the truth
commission’s recommendations, particularly considering new and
updated information and thoughtful discordant voices;
(3) assessing the effectiveness of implementing actions already
taken to determine what more is needed to repair the persisting
damage (both individual and communal);
(4) in view of (1), (2), and (3), recommending and overseeing
concrete follow-up steps as part of a larger integrated reparative
justice plan in light of evolving political, social, and economic
conditions; and
(5) fostering reparative justice in ways that benefit the survivors
and descendants of the historic injustice, including their
communties; that assure accountability; and that enhance the

276

There are a number of possible organization structures for an “independent” entity.
One that integrates government support without undue government control could be a
non-profit organization that has operation expenses funded for a defined period by a
government block grant—with specific additional programs supported by private
funding.
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democratic legitimacy of the participating governments and private
organizations.277
These broad goals would help a Task Force envision and guide further
needed reparative actions in light of the “Four Rs” of social healing through
justice—recognition, responsibility, reconstruction, and reparation.
C. A Fourth Step in Operation
1. Assessing Tr uth Commission Findings and Recommendations and
Implementing Actions Taken
Assessing the efficacy of truth commission recommendations is integral
to a sense of justice done. Truth commission recommendations, usually set
forth in a formal commission report, are the foundation for reconciliation
initiatives.278

But,

as

predicted

by

critiques

of

reconciliation’s

communitarian philosophy, victims or perpetrators sometimes challenge the
legitimacy of truth commission inquiries because they view them as either
politically motivated or insufficiently backed by evidence.279 While
277

See Yamamoto et al., supra note 24, at 45.
See, e.g., CHEGA! THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION IN TIMOR-LESTE (CAVR) (2005), http://www.cavrtimorleste.org/en/chegaReport.htm; After 10 Years, CAVR Report Still Resonates in
Timor-Leste and Around the World, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Feb. 23, 2016),
https://www.ictj.org/news/10-years-cavr-report-timor-leste-truth (detailing how the
CAVR truth commission report paved the way for an “innovative community
reconciliation program” and contributed to grassroots peace in Timor-Leste); The
Canadian Press, Manitoba Tables Bill to Act on Truth and Reconciliation
Recommendations, CTV NEWS (Feb. 25, 2016),
http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/manitoba-tables-bill-to-act-on-truth-and-reconciliationrecommendations-1.2793053 (indicating that the truth and reconciliation commission
recommendations led to the Manitoba government proposing a law that would “lay a path
toward reconciliation with Indigenous people”).
279
See, e.g., Truth Seeking, supra note 211, at 15 (citing the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of the Democratic Republic of Congo as a truth commission perceived as
politically motivated because the appointments to the commission occurred before the
commission was governed by a legal statute and were dependent on political affiliations
to the parties represented at the peace negotiations in 2002).
278
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affording appropriate deference to the commission, a Task Force would
assess

the

completeness

of

the

commission’s

findings

and

recommendations. Input from scholars, human rights groups, businesses,
nonprofit community organizations, and government officials would bolster
the legitimacy of this work.280
Reconciliation initiatives stall, sometimes abruptly, because of weak or
incomplete truth commission recommendations.281 According to the
International Center for Transitional Justice, “recommendations that are too
general, not based on the actual inquiry, or lacking the support of
authoritative technical expertise [do] not have the credibility to garner the
support needed for implementation.”282 At other times, salutary interim
recommendations are omitted from final commission recommendations.283
At still other times, clearly appropriate recommendations—for instance,
individual reparations for those still suffering—are missing altogether,
undercutting the legitimacy of the overall initiative.284 Thus, a primary
objective of a fourth step Task Force would be to assess the efficacy and
completeness of original recommendations (and supporting findings) and
fill gaps in light of new information.285
Especially important, the fourth step follow-up Task Force would then
evaluate implemented actions to date. In particular, it might discern the
280

See id. (emphasizing the importance of “meaningful consultation with all interested
parties and their involvement,” particularly the participation of “government, civil
society, victims groups, and others who may be impacted by the work of the
commission”).
281
See supra Section II.B.
282
González et al., supra note 26, at xii.
283
For example, South Korea’s 2005 TRCK made both interim and final
recommendations that “appear[ed] to be in tension in many important respects,” and
many of its recommendations were inconsistent with those issued by other specialized
South Korea truth commissions. Melish, supra note 2, at 16.
284
See supra Section II.B.
285
See Melish, supra note 2, at 16 (stating that “these considerations will need to be
closely attended by advocates and other stakeholders in the implementation process
ahead”).

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Bridging the Chasm...

appropriateness of reconstructive and reparative actions taken—for
instance, apologies issued, memorials erected, educational institutions
established, and community economic capacity-building initiated. It would
do this assessment with an eye on actual consequences for victims,286
communities, and the larger society. And it would approach this task with
fairness and balance—by commending salutary efforts, constructively
critiquing shortcomings, and suggesting further grounded actions.
2. Shepher ding Fur ther Implementation
As part of that task, the fourth step Task Force could sponsor social
science studies on cultural and economic impacts. It could monitor national
and local governments’ and private groups’ participation in the
implementation process.287 And it might regularly publish summary
progress reports on what the government and others have and have not
accomplished, along with suggestions for new or revised measures.288 In
short, the Task Force might operate as a review and reporting service to
track implementation.
The Task Force might also create working groups to interact with
businesses, local officials, and community organizations to address
politically challenging recommendations. Perhaps most important, those
working groups would work with, lobby, or pressure executive and
legislative branches of local and national governments to shepherd policy
prescriptions into programs, particularly those addressing economic justice.
More broadly, the Task Force might encourage governments and private
organizations to devote resources for public education campaigns, coalesce
survivors’ stories into widely publicized public records, and facilitate

286

See Waterhouse, supra note 19, at 267-70 (emphasizing the need to design and
implement reparative programs from the victims’ perspectives).
287
See Yamamoto et al., supra note 24, at 45 n.209.
288
See Truth Seeking, supra note 211, at 67-69.
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research on law and policy initiatives aimed at preventing future repetition
of past abuses.
3. Refashioning and Over seeing New Paths For war d in Light of
Evolving Conditions
Politics, economics, and social norms often influence the implementation
of truth commission recommendations.289 These often-shifting realpolitik
influences regularly reshape government policies, transform economic
prospects, and alter public consciousness about what is right and just.290
The political backdrop affects the operations and perceived legitimacy of
the implementation process.291 Changing presidential or legislative
leadership sometimes undermines reparative actions.292 Conflicts at home

289

See, e.g., id. (recognizing that “key recommendations on justice, reparations and
archives have not yet been implemented[,] . . . [which] is due principally to problems
within the parliamentary system and the politics of Timor-Leste’s relationship with
Indonesia” and that the greatest challenge to implementing the truth commission report’s
recommendations today is that the implementation of the most important
recommendations related to human rights committed by Indonesia is “subject to the
politics of the relationship between Dili and Jakarta”).
290
See generally THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS (Pablo de Grieff ed., 2008)
(addressing the importance of politics in shaping a wide range of reparations initiatives).
291
For human rights scholar Tara Melish, “whether a truth commission is effective
depends to a large extent upon two critical factors: (1) whether it is able to attract the
attention of its constituents, and (2) whether the commission is perceived as legitimate
among members of the mass public.” Melish, supra note 2, at 24. See also Marteh, supra
note 275 (addressing the politics in Liberia behind the implementation of truth and
reconciliation report recommendations and the danger of quantifying, rather than
providing qualitatively analyzing, implementation efforts by the government).
292
See, e.g., San Yamin Aung, Outgoing Parliament Approves Presidential Protection,
Immunity Bill, IRRAWADDY (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/outgoingparliament-approves-presidential-protection-immunity-bill.html (noting that on the last
sitting day of the outgoing Burma Parliament, lawmakers approved the controversial
Presidential Security Bill, which “guarantees lifetime personal security and legal
immunity for former heads of state” and which was apparently expedited for the benefit
of the outgoing President Thein Sein); Marteh, supra note 275 (noting that the path to
reconciliation shifted upon the election of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who has
championed national reconciliation for Liberia).
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and abroad stall sensitive recommendations.293 Unstable administrations,
especially those partly responsible for historic injustices, at times halt
implementing actions.294 Excessive control by government officials
potentially dampens meaningful—and legitimizing—public participation.295
With ebbing and flowing political and economic tides, the impediments to
social healing are numerous and varied.
For instance, according to transitional justice advocate Kim Dong-Choon,
political constraints curtailed the implementation of the recommendations
of South Korea’s 2005 TRCK.296 Those constraints encompassed politicians
deploying Cold War anti-communist rhetoric to justify human rights
violations, former government officials refusing to cooperate because of
involvement in past abuses, and military officials opposing the entire
reconciliation undertaking.297
Economic upheavals also weigh heavily on policymaker efforts.
Governments sometimes cite recessions, fluctuating markets, or pressing
military expenditures as reasons to postpone individual payments, economic
capacity-building, and institutional restructuring.298 Careful Task Force
293
See, e.g., Cristián Correa, From Principles to Practice: Challenges of Implementing
Reparations for Massive Violations in Colombia, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. (Oct.
2015),
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ_Report_ColombiaReparationsChallenges_20
15.pdf (discussing the various challenges to implementing recommendations due to the
ongoing armed conflicts in Colombia).
294
See, e.g., After 10 Years, supra note 278 (noting that Timor-Leste, “for pragmatic
reasons,” prefers to both ignore the CAVR truth commission report’s recommendations
and “argue that its duty of care is being met through its social security, health, and other
services”).
295
See, e.g., Kim, supra note 111, at 112-22 (indicating that the implementation of TRCK
recommendations mainly rested in the hands of the national government with little public
participation).
296
See id.
297
See id.; see also Melish, supra note 2, at 18.
298
For example, the International Center for Transitional Justice highlighted how the
political and economic relationship between Timor-Leste and Indonesia has impacted
implementation efforts as follows:
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evaluation of those delay claims, with an assessment of priorities, would be
important for fashioning steps forward.
Finally, evolving social norms also shape implementation. Increasing
attention to gender, sexual orientation, race, and indigeneity encourages
marginalized groups to advocate for heightened recognition and tailored
remedies.299 Similarly, evolving concerns about environmental preservation,
peace, and responsible economic development sometimes reshape the tenor
and specifics of social healing.300 For instance, notions of gender redress
now spur reparations advocacy for mass sexual violence, and environmental
justice tenets bolster opposition to military base construction where past
injustice awaits remediation.301

[I]t is important to remind ourselves that Timor-Leste has land and sea borders
with its large neighbor [Indonesia] and, as it emerges from deep poverty and
trauma and oil prices head south, now depends on Indonesia heavily for
investment, educational opportunity, communications, and affordable goods
and services. This economic relationship is being extended to military and
other forms of cooperation. This leaves little if any wriggle room for justice
and reparations for past crimes; both in fact are opposed by Timor-Leste’s
leaders, even though a number of high-ranking Indonesian military officers
have been indicted by the UN-supported serious crimes process. Timor-Leste’s
policy is also a convenient fig-leaf for the international community, which also
prioritizes good relations with Jakarta and has a vested interest in letting
bygones be bygones.
After 10 Years, supra note 278.
See generally Pettit, supra note 61, at 278-79 (examining intersectional race-gender
sensitive redress with a focus on sexual violence); Eric K. Yamamoto & Michele Park
Sonen, Reparations Law: Redress Bias?, in IMPLICIT BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 265 (Justin
D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) (calling for intersectional race-gender
sensitive redress to account for implicit redress bias); Michele Park Sonen, Healing
Multidimensional Wounds of Injustice Intersectionality and the Korean “Comfort
Women,” 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 269 (2012) (employing an intersectional racegender redress analysis for Korean comfort women).
300
See, e.g., Yamamoto et al., supra note 24, at 75-81 (discussing the devastating damage
to Jeju Island’s natural environment and calling for attention to economic justice).
301
See generally id. at 68-78.
299
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Because political, social, and economic conditions sometimes evolve
rapidly during implementation, an expanded reconciliation template needs
to anticipate and account for realpolitik shifts.302 Thus, a fourth step Task
Force would not focus solely on assessing and implementing existing
recommendations. It would also evaluate evolving conditions, refashion
recommendations as needed, and oversee new social healing paths
forward—all toward the goal of recalibrating and reinvigorating the original
reconciliation commitment.
To assist in that process, a fourth step Task Force might establish a
formal Citizens’ Council to better integrate local voices. That Citizens’
Council could advise the Task Force about emerging environmental,
cultural, and peace-related conditions.303
A fourth step Task Force might also facilitate accords or settlements,
assuring broad stakeholder input into the tenor and substance of reparative
agreements. Active Task Force engagement with political decision-makers
might obviate problems of legitimacy by preventing politically expedient
words of redress without accompanying reconstruction and reparation—for
instance, Japan’s initial apology to South Korea’s World War II military sex
slaves.
The latest Japanese apology, which some have seen as part of a
strategic geopolitical deal struck between Japan and South Korea,
has led to protests among the 46 surviving South Korean victims as
well as the victims in other countries occupied by Japan during the
war. After working for 15 years on reparations for victims in over
50 countries, [the International Center for Transitional Justice]
found that many victims feel that an apology unaccompanied by
other forms of reparation does not constitute justice, even as

302

See supra Section II.
See, e.g., Yamamoto et al., supra note 24, at 68-78 (suggesting a similar sort of
Citizens’ Council in the context of Jeju 4.3 reconciliation).

303
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material reparations, such as compensation, without a meaningful
acknowledgement of responsibility also falls short.304
In sum, an Assessment, Implementation, and Oversight Task Force
would serve as a practical fourth step for coalescing recognition and
responsibility and for recalibrating and overseeing reconstructive and
reparative actions. This implementation fourth step thus would aim to foster
comprehensive and sustained social healing—for those harmed and their
families in ways that also benefit communities and the larger society.305
D. Two Partial Archetypes
How might a fourth step Assessment, Implementation, and Oversight
Task Force look and operate in practice? Two follow-up initiatives offer
distinct partial archetypes. They may be viewed as distinct archetypes
because their structures reflect two vastly differing foundational
approaches. The first involves privately sponsored assessment and
recalibration efforts to evaluate post-truth commission reconstruction and
reparation. The second reflects a multifaceted initiative mainly under
government bureaucratic control to facilitate implementation of specific
commission recommendations. The two initiatives are partial because they
embody practical follow-up limitations. Both initiatives are concisely
described here not as fourth step models but as comparative bases for
evaluating and refining the Task Force proposal.
1. The Inter national Center for Tr ansitional J ustice’s Assessment of
Per u’s Tr uth and Reconciliation Pr ocess
The International Center for Transitional Justice pioneered the
assessment and implementation functions of a fourth step follow-up when it
304
David Tolbert, Japan’s Apology to Shows What Public Apologies Should (Not) Do,
HUFF. POST (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-tolbert/japansapology-to-south-k_b_9111566.html.
305
See Yamamoto et al., supra note 24, at 80-81.
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assessed Peruvian reconciliation efforts in 2013. After Peru’s violent
conflict from 1980 to the mid-1990s, the Peruvian government initiated a
reconciliation process that encompassed the government and armed
opposition groups.306 Both sides committed widespread human rights
violations, with over 60,000 disappeared or murdered and with
disproportionate harms to indigenous rural peasant communities.307
Reconciliation efforts aimed to surface this truth to facilitate economic
justice for victims and to rebuild communities.308 The truth commission
thus investigated socioeconomic causes of the conflict, designated limited
initial funds for victim capacity-building, and recommended institutional
restructuring.309 For some, this broad approach demonstrated the
government’s commitment to social healing.310
306
See Cristián Correa, Reparations in Peru: From Recommendations to Implementation,
INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 3-4 (2013),
http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ_Report_Peru_Reparations_2013.pdf. In 1993,
the Peruvian government declared victory over the Shining Path and initiated
reconciliation efforts. See Jemima Garcia-Godos, Victim Reparations in the Peruvian
Truth Commission and the Challenge of Historical Interpretation, 2 INT’L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 63, 70 (2008). The legislature provided limited compensation to a
few victims. Id. at 71. Responding in 2001 to demands for further reconciliation efforts,
Peru’s then-president and legislature established the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the Plan Integral de Reparaciones (PIR). Lisa J. Laplante, On the
Indivisibility of Rights: Truth Commissions, Reparations, and the Rights to Development,
10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 141, 159 (2007).
307
Correa, supra note 306, at 3.
308
From 1980 to the mid-1990s, the Shining Path—one of the major opposition groups—
engaged in a violent armed conflict with the government. Id. at 3-4. Throughout this
period, the government and Shining Path forcibly displaced 600,000 people and killed
and disappeared 70,000 more. See Garcia-Godos, supra note 306, at 68. Widespread
human rights violations by both sides included decimation of uninvolved rural
communities, which held many indigenous inhabitants. Laplante, supra note 306, at 143;
see Garcia-Godos, supra note 306, at 68. The conflict disproportionally harmed these
groups and intensified Peru’s painful history of subordinating indigenous peasant
communities. See Garcia-Godos, supra note 306, at 68.
309
The PIR investigated specific acts and resulting harms and also examined deeper
socioeconomic causes. See Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 8. See also
Laplante, supra note 306, at 160 (noting the PIR’s “components include symbolic
reparations, attention to physical and mental health, educational opportunities, restitution
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Despite these broad initial efforts, criticism emerged about the
incompleteness of government implementation.311 Critics maintained that
because the conflict inflicted enduring damage, the reconciliation initiative
needed a stronger emphasis on economic redress.312 In 2011, in response to
continued criticism, the Peruvian government announced a plan to pay
individual reparations.313 The money allocated (less than $100 per person),
however, seemed to “many to be too little, too late.”314 The government
then acknowledged that no one had been fully compensated and promised to
complete the reparations process within ten years.315 Yet, especially for
indigenous communities, the minimal individual reparations and the lack of
real economic capacity-building signaled the reconciliation initiative’s
overall failure.316
At this juncture, the private International Center for Transitional Justice
stepped in and conducted an extensive, independent assessment.317 Focusing
on reconstruction and reparation (in the broader sense of “repair”), the
International Center’s assessment evaluated the implementation of the truth
commission’s existing recommendations.318 That assessment covered the
and rehabilitation of citizen rights, collective reparations and individual economic
reparations. Beneficiaries of these measures include both direct and indirect victims.”). It
recommended economic justice initiatives, including individual economic capacitybuilding and payments for those directly injured and institutional reconstruction.
Laplante, supra note 306, at 160. Part of the plan sought to address the root of the conflict
by generating infrastructure for education, health, and jobs. Id.
310
See Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 8.
311
See Greiff, supra note 85, at 470–71. The government then established a fund for
education, health, and economic projects associated with the PIR. See Yamamoto &
Mackintosh, supra note 104, at 8. These projects, however, were open to only a few. Id.
312
See Greiff, supra note 85, at 470–71.
313
Angel Pez, Rights-Peru: No Reparations for Families of Civil War Victims,
INTERPRESS SERV. (July 27, 2010), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=52284.
314
Id.
315
See Cabitza, supra note 86.
316
See id.
317
See Correa, supra note 306.
318
See id.
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recommended victims’ registry, economic reparations (individual and
collective), political changes (including recognition of civil and political
rights), and other reparative measures (relating to education, physical and
mental health, housing, memorials, the search for victim remains, and the
court access for victims’ civil claims).319 Overall, the International Center’s
follow-up work, although not broadly participatory and without formal
government approval or participation, illustrated a key aspect of the
envisioned assessment and implementation roles of a fourth step follow-up
Task Force.320
As part of its assessment, the International Center worked toward an
objective evaluation—detailing both productive steps forward and
backsliding—of each major truth commission recommendation.321 It
commended the Peruvian reconciliation initiative for taking “significant
steps to address the severe and massive human rights violations committed
during the country’s internal conflict.”322 And it recognized that the
reconciliation measures “strengthen[ed] democracy and human rights
protections and prevent[ed] the recurrence of violence.”323 The assessment,
as

mentioned,

also

constructively

critiqued

constrained

Peruvian

government reparative actions, revealing salutary steps as well as salient
omissions.
The International Center’s assessment thereby illuminated gaps in the
Peruvian government’s efforts. Notably, the assessment shed light on the
319

See generally id. By 2012, the victims’ registry had registered 160,429 individual
victims, 7,678 communities, and 32 organizations of displaced people. Id. at 10. The
International Center’s assessment group commended the victims’ registry for its “flexible
guidelines for evaluating different types of violations eligible for reparations” and for its
efforts to make its services accessible to people in rural areas. Id. at 9. But the assessment
group also noted that not all of the people registered would qualify for compensation,
leaving the “unqualified” feeling left out and ignored. Id.
320
See generally id.
321
See id.
322
See id.
323
See id.

VOLUME 15 • ISSUE 1 • 2016

181

182 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

government’s “trend of providing isolated measures” to address systematic
abuses.324 It observed that as a result of the government’s piecemeal efforts,
“reparations will lack the comprehensiveness that the Truth Commission
recommended and that the Reparations Law and its implementing decree
envisioned.”325 Most important, in uplifting perspectives of those suffering,
the International Center identified a glaring reparations gap between victim
expectations and government actions.326 “Victims must still continue to wait
– even after having suffered a serious violation sometimes twenty or more
years ago and having navigated the long victim-registration process to
finally achieve some recognition as right bearers. . . . [t]his process is
inconsistent with the message that a reparations policy should carry.”327
Overall, the International Center called for full implementation of original
truth commission recommendations.328 It also pointed toward additional
actions

needed

to

further

reconciliation

efforts,

including

accommodation of indigenous communities’ voices and needs.

better

329

The International Center thus articulated compelling critiques of the
social healing process, both salutary dimensions and failings.330 In doing so,
it highlighted the assessment and implementation functions of a fourth step
mechanism, spelling out what governments, independent researchers,
scholars, advocates, human rights organizations, businesses, and community
advocates might undertake as primary follow-up steps.
Yet, the International Center stated some of its recommendations
subtly.331 Political realities may have counseled caution in proactively
generating pointed directives. The International Center, without active
324

See id.
See id.
326
See id.
327
See id.
328
See generally id.
329
Id.
330
Id.
331
Id.
325
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government participation and formal oversight authority, lacked the power
to guide follow-through prescriptions for needed reconstruction and
reparation.332
2. South Kor ea TRCK’s Follow-up Boar d
In contrast with the International Center’s assessment, the South Korea
TRCK’s

follow-up

mechanism

entailed

substantial

government

involvement. But extensive government agency control and changes in
national political leadership likely dampened or even undermined follow-up
efforts.
South Korea’s TRCK policymakers and administrators contemplated two
follow-up bodies for implementing specific recommendations.333 First,
within the TRCK, policymakers created a “Reconciliation Committee . . . to
administer reconciliation and memorial efforts, establish a road-map for
settling the past, investigate psychological damages and development of
review programs for reconciliation, and to search for methods to improve
recommendations for each individual case.”334 Second, the TRCK’s
Framework

Act

contemplated

a
335

Recommendations Follow-up Board.

government

administrative

The Act, however, did not bestow

upon the follow-up board the authority to implement commission
332

Id.
Melish, supra note 2, at 24 (citing the Framework Act for the 2005 TRCK and its
Three Year Plan).
334
See generally THREE YEAR REPORT, supra note 233.
335
The Framework Act provided that “any case approved for investigation must be
reported to the Recommendation Follow-up Board on measures for restoration of the
victims’ honor, reconciliation of the victims and offenders, the prevention of incident
repetition, the revision, abolishment, or creation of related laws, policies, and practices,
and the education and promotion for building historical consciousness.” Framework Act
on Clearing up Past Incidents for Truth and Reconciliation, Law No. 7542, Article 34,
paragraph 4, May 31, 2005 [hereinafter Framework Act], reprinted in THREE YEAR
REPORT, supra note 233, translation available at
http://www.jinsil.go.kr/English/Information/legal/read.asp?num=76&pageno=1&stype=
& sval=&data_years=2012&data_month=.
333
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recommendations. South Korea’s legislative and executive branches
retained control.336 And supervisory agencies lacked any legal and systemic
duty to implement recommendations.337
To activate the Framework Act’s plan for implementation, South Korea’s
president issued a presidential decree for “Regulations on the Establishment
and Operation of the Recommendations Follow-Up Board.”338 The decree
officially created the Recommendations Follow-up Board—a high-level
interagency system for implementing specific TRCK recommendations.339
This envisioned follow-up administrative body was placed initially under
the Office of the Prime Minister and later under the Ministry of Public
Administration and Security.340 The body was comprised of several
committees tasked with managing the implementation of TRCK
recommendations, including drafting implementation agenda, reviewing
progress, and announcing results.341
The board would adhere to a firm timeline for specific action.342 In
response to TRCK recommended measures, the board would interact with
the heads of government agencies.343 These political administrators would
generate implementation plans and submit them to the board.344
The board would transmit the implementation plans to a working
committee,345 led by the Vice Minister of Public Administration and

336

THREE YEAR REPORT, supra note 233, at 32.
Id. at 32.
338
Presidential Decree No. 195, Aug. 27, 2007, reprinted in THREE YEAR REPORT, supra
note 233, at 107.
339
Melish, supra note 2, at 24 (citing the Framework Act for the 2005 TRCK and its
Three Year Plan).
340
THREE YEAR REPORT, supra note 233, at 107.
341
Id. at 32.
342
Id.
343
Id. at 33.
344
Id.
345
Id.
337
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Security and comprised of high-ranking officials of related ministries.346
This working committee would further refine the implementation agenda.347
During preliminary deliberations, TRCK members could provide input.348
The working committee would then pass the implementation agenda to a
“Deliberation Council,” led by the Minister of Public Administration and
Security and comprised of vice ministers of related ministries.349 The
Council would hold quarterly meetings to update government actors of
implementation tasks.350
The Recommendations Follow-Up Board thus would work with
government leaders and specific government agencies to facilitate
implementation of specific TRCK recommendations. It would notify the
TRCK about progress.351 Overall, the board and TRCK would collaborate to
“regularly examine and analyze the planning and implementation processes
of recommendations in order to revise inefficiencies in the relevant policies,
systems, or procedures.”352
Despite the carefully calibrated structure and timeline, the board’s
implementing operations stalled. The Recommendations Follow-Up Board
initially received 49 findings and recommendations from the TRCK for
implementation.353 According to former TRCK Standing Commissioner
Kim Dong-Choon, “despite the creation of these new [follow-up]
institutions, implementation of the TRCK’s recommendations has been
slow and highly uneven.”354 He noted that the government implemented
“relatively easy measures—those not politically sensitive or financially
346

Id.
Id.
348
Id.
349
Id.
350
Id.
351
Id.
352
Id. at 112.
353
Kim, supra note 111, at 113.
354
Id.
347
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burdensome.”355 Other and more significant recommendations—the
revision of historical records, compensation of damages, and peace and
human rights education—remained untouched.356
Although promising in theory, with its multi-tiered bureaucratic structure,
the Follow-up Board apparently proved ineffective in practice. The
interagency implementation system, operated entirely by government
actors, largely avoided difficult, important recommendations and failed at
“directly involving petitioners or other concerned stakeholders in the
monitoring and implementation process.”357 The ebbs and flows of the
national government’s political will and government officials’ control over
the Follow-up Board and its committees undermined active victim and
community participation. In short, the follow-up mechanism lacked
sufficient independence to function as a collaborative body that included
government participation in, but not full control over, the process.
Indeed, when President Lee Myung-bak’s conservative party assumed
power in 2008, the TRCK and the Follow-up Board faced increasing
roadblocks.358 TRCK supporters blamed this shift in political power for the
Follow-up Board’s ineffectiveness and eventual dissolution,

359

asserting

that President Lee’s administration was “uncomfortable with the scrutiny of
the country’s past” and wanted the TRCK “shut down.”360 The TRCK
dissolved in 2010.361 The Follow-Up Board also significantly scaled back
its work and apparently later disbanded, leaving many important
355

Id.
Id.
357
Melish, supra note 2, at 46.
358
Ashley Rowland & Hwang Hae-rym, Time Running Out on South Korea’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, STARS & STRIPES (Jan. 19, 2010),
http://www.stripes.com/news/time-running-out-on-south-korea-s-truth-andreconciliation-commission-1.98156.
359
Id.
360
Id.
361
Id. Rising tensions with North Korea may have also shifted the South Korea
government’s attention away from addressing past government injustices. Id.
356
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recommendations, especially those politically or financially sensitive, as
“unfinished business.”362
E. Structurally Integrating Government and Civil Society
Just as too much, or sole, government control over implementation bodes
ill for genuine social healing, so too does too little government involvement.
Public participation is crucial, but as integral component, not as sole mover.
With the government-controlled TRCK follow-up experience partly in
mind, some scholars focus on public participation as the primary component
of an implementation fourth step. Justice scholars John Ciorciari and Jaya
Ramji-Nogales view civil society as “unofficial implementing agencies” of
truth commission recommendations.363 Professor Tara Melish predicts that
organizations comprising “civil society” could find ways to “construct,
monitor, and police an accountability framework in which concrete
responsibilities can be distributed among stakeholders, who can then be
held answerable for following through on their commitments.”364
In essence, rather than a formal implementation body, Ciorciari, Nogales,
and Melish suggest that unofficial civil society “agencies” might serve as
the critical follow-up fourth step in the reconciliation process, apparently
through lobbying, consciousness raising, and strategic pressuring of
government decision-makers. Without this kind of engagement, “political
resistance and entrenched interests will ensure that reforms are superficial if
362
There appears to be no English paper trail for the Recommendations Follow-Up
Board. The current Ministry of Public Administration and Security’s website does not
mention or have any archival material on the Recommendations Follow-Up Board or its
involvement in the TRCK implementation process. There appears to be no mention of the
Recommendations Follow-Up Board in English beyond the last TRCK report published
in 2007. Much of the account in this article about the Follow-Up board is drawn from
Kim, supra note 111, at 113.
363
John D. Ciorciari & Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Lessons from the Cambodian Experience
with Truth and Reconciliation, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193, 194 (2012).
364
Melish, supra note 2, at 63.
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undertaken at all.”365 By contrast, active civil society control would shape
reparative actions according to real community needs and priorities.366 In
this way, civil society would help translate high expectations into concrete
implementation plans and actions.367
The civil society approach aptly highlights the essential participation of
non-governmental organizations, community advocates, journalists, and the
general populace. And political organizing is critical for raising public
consciousness and applying pressure for official responses.368 But
experience shows public engagement is not enough after a commission
makes recommendations to compel needed implementation.369
A generally stated civil society approach to implementation370 appears to
leave unaddressed four realities about post-commission follow-up. First, it
assumes that civil society would find ways to coalesce around
implementation without an overarching organizing authority.371 Second, it
365

See id. at 23.
See id. at 64.
367
For example, public organizations and community groups would have a pivotal role in
providing continued “effective support to victims who may find the truth-seeking process
an onerous and challenging journey.” González et al., supra note 26, at x.
368
See generally González et al., supra note 26 and accompanying text.
369
See supra Sections II.B. & III.A (describing unimplemented truth commission
recommendations). Reasons may vary for lesser sustained post-commission collective
efforts for implementation—people have already been given a recognized voice through
public hearings; causes have been investigated; some recommendations have been acted
upon; collective political energy is directed elsewhere. This subject warrants further
inquiry.
370
That lack of specificity may simply reflect a primary focus on the idea of the need for
an implementing mechanism.
371
Melish suggests generally that implementation of recommendations by a “permanent
follow-up body” is “fundamentally a responsibility of all social stakeholders, responsibly
supported by the international community and other human rights actors across the
globe.” Melish, supra note 200, at 315. Melish’s suggestion delegates the bulk of
responsibility for implementation to civil society (although undefined, this apparently
means mainly non-governmental organizations, media watch-dogs and community
activists) without fully accounting for the important role of government officials and
private businesses. See id. More specifically, Melish anticipates that individuals and nongovernmental organizations that comprise civil society will unite on their own to
366
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downplays the need for structure—effective monitoring and policing
require organization, coordination, and regular funding, both for operations
and for oversight, including some form of government participation.372
Third, it looks past the need for stature—recognition or even legal standing
with policymakers, bureaucrats, businesses, and community groups helps
transform plans into actions, particularly those tapping the public fisc.373
And fourth, it assumes that a loosely organized civil society, without a
strong organizational structure, can function effectively as a follow-up
implementation body that is accountable for its actions (and inactions).374
undertake implementing and oversight actions without an overarching organizing and
funding authority. See id. But mutual engagement by all, especially by those governments
formerly complicit in or directly responsible for historic injustices, would be essential to
a achieving a sense of “justice done.”
372
Government representatives, as well as scholars and private business and public
institutional representatives, would need to collaborate with civil society representatives
in creating, operating, and partially funding a fourth-step mechanism. Their participation
would also be essential to devising and carrying out implementation and oversight
activities and ensuring that each stakeholder assumes appropriate financial and
substantive responsibility. A crucial structural piece of the implementing and oversight
body would be shared power so that government participation contributes to but does not
control agendas and tasks.
373
Melish’s approach overlooks the need for formal recognition and some degree of legal
standing of a follow-up body with policymakers, administrators, and the public, which
would be essential to prospects of actualizing responsibility for assessment,
implementation, refashioning and oversight actions. The potential for civil society
programs, protests, and journalist exposés would be an important part of the mix. But
experiences in many venues show that they might be effective in challenging illegitimate
authority but are not, alone, nearly enough to fashion and administer concrete steps
toward reconstruction and reparation. See, e.g., Matthew Vadum, George Soros Funds
Occupy Wall Street, HUMAN EVENTS (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://humanevents.com/2011/10/21/george-soros-funds-occupy-wall-street/ (referencing
the organizational and funding problems with the social movement, Occupy Wall Street).
Government and private sector representatives would also contribute to tempering the
political and economic forces that otherwise, at times, impede reconciliation efforts.
Victims and community advocates would play a central collaborative role. And
responsibility, essential to social healing through justice, would be appropriately
attributed to key stakeholders in ways that enhance democratic legitimacy.
374
The idea that civil society would function as a follow-up mechanism imbues “civil
society” with a structure that does not exist. A fourth step follow-up would likely be a
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The envisioned fourth step Assessment, Implementation, and Oversight
Task Force would embrace active civil society participation but not rely
primarily upon it. Rather, a Task Force would aim to integrate participation
by civil society organizations at all stages of its implementation work and
look to those organizations for generating public input and support.
Moreover, the Task Force’s operating structure would not replicate the
TRCK follow-up board’s near-full control by political leaders and
bureaucrats. But it also would not jettison government participation, instead
favoring active involvement without overriding control. The Task Force
would build in a crucial mix of interested participants not only to uplift
varying perspectives but also to provide checks and balances. That balance
of power would need to be carefully calibrated at the outset in the Task
Force’s originating structure.
The Task Force, then, would be informed less by a pure communitarian
ethos than by a realpolitik sense that social healing is a multi-faceted, often
conflictual struggle that entails continual recalibration and reinvigoration—
but a struggle nevertheless worth the candle for those still suffering, their
communities, and the larger society.

VI. CONCLUSION
The

aim

of

this

article’s

proposed

integrated

Assessment,

Implementation, and Oversight Task Force is not to fashion a cure-all for
reconciliation ills. Rather, its aim is to squarely address what is currently
missing from stalled or incomplete reconciliation initiatives almost
everywhere: a fourth step implementation bridge over the chasm between
aspiration and realization.
specific, cognizable body that not only “speaks and acts” with authority but would also
be accountable for its actions and inactions. The diverse and diffuse aspects of “civil
society” would therefore participate through this fourth-step assessment, implementation,
and oversight body, but primary or sole reliance on civil society would not be
pragmatically effective.
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It might be a pathway over the “institutionalized attempts to frustrate the
goals and functionality of the truth commission” of South Korea.375 Or a
route forward for sorely disappointed indigenous Peruvians demanding
“badly needed and long-delayed economic justice” after minimalist follow
through on truth commission reparations recommendations.376 Or a
spotlight on South Africa government’s and businesses’ choice not to
“follow through on commission recommendations,” compromising not only
the “commission’s contributions but the very process [or reconciliation]
itself.”377 Or a portal to self-determination for the United States to “make
right the wrong” to Native Hawaiians by fulfilling its long-standing
commitment to reconciliation that “has been thus far denied.”378
In

these

and

other

ways

reconciliation’s

needed

assessment,

implementation, and oversight fourth step, in concept and in practice,
potentially channels often-fractious political and social interests further
down a mutually beneficial path toward social healing through justice.

375

See supra Sections III.A, IV.B and V.C & D (describing the South Korea Truth and
Reconciliation Commission process and impacts).
376
See Melish, supra note 2.
377
See supra notes 5 and 6 and accompanying text.
378
See supra notes 7, 8, and 39 and accompanying text.
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